

CHARLES GOYETTE: HOW TO LOSE YOUR JOB IN TALK RADIO

FEBRUARY 2, 2004

The American Conservative

MAN OF THE YEAR

Cheney Builds an Empire

By Georgie Anne Geyer

**Playboy at 50
Seizing Saddam
Dinner with Chloe**

CATHOLIC LITURGY: Schlock & No Awe

In many Catholic parishes today, the sense of awe — of majesty and mystery — has largely been banished. The incense, sanctus bell, votive candles, and Communion rail are gone. The Tabernacle with the reserved Sacrament — having been replaced by the Presider's Chair or a bouquet of twigs — can't be found. Statues of the saints are locked in the basement, replaced by balloons, banners with greeting-card sentiments, and other dime-store decorations. The organ gathers cobwebs. And the crucifix has been taken down, replaced by a rainbow flag.

It's virtually impossible to pray before or after Mass because of all the chatter and backslapping. The Creed is left unsaid. Schlockmeister-homilists pander with feel-good bubblics and lame jokes. The words of the readings and liturgy are gender-bended (but don't you dare bend your knee for the Eucharistic Prayer!). The sanctuary has become a stage, and we must clap, clap, clap for the liturgical dancers, the clowns, the band, and Ms. Cantor with her conga drums — we aren't making a joyful noise unto the Lord, but only unto the (amateurish) entertainers.

In many parishes the primary purpose of the Mass has been transformed from receiving Christ and worshipping the Almighty into "celebrating community" — i.e., celebrating our wonderful selves. One so-called liturgical expert, the now-disgraced Archbishop Weakland, has said the Mass shouldn't convey "a feeling of infinity or eternity or the world beyond," for it's really about "communal sensitivity" among parishioners. But touchie-feelie Catholicism — where, at the

Sign of Peace, the band breaks into lounge music for ten minutes of hugging and laughing — has no power or magnetism. Not many people get out of bed on Sunday morning in search of huggies and giggles.

No wonder church attendance among Catholics has dropped by over half since the liturgical trivialities began. And today most Catholics don't believe in the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist — which isn't surprising, given that how we worship has a profound effect on what we believe about the meaning of the Mass.


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[TERRORISM]

SAFER NOW?

Wasn't it wonderful how the capture of Saddam Hussein made us feel so much safer at Christmas? The beast of Baghdad, his "spider hole" location betrayed by his compatriots, tracked to his lair. The cruel dictator, probed and poked with a tongue-depressor by American doctors as they combed his hair for lice. Were those images of victory or what?

Problem is, as became clear soon enough after the capture, Saddam wasn't the main threat to America's security, and indeed never was. That threat, al-Qaeda, is still very much alive. Hence the Orange Alert, the threat of hijacking, the cancellation of a dozen flights, the F-16s flying airline escort duty.

And then, a few days after Saddam's capture, a near-miss assassination of Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf—and the grim reminder that if he fell, his government's nuclear weapons might in the blink of an eye fall into the hands of Islamic extremists.

The United States still faces a formidable terror threat and in all likelihood will for a long time to come. Questions worth asking: are Islamic terrorists made more powerful or less so by the invasion of a Muslim country by a (mostly) Christian army? Is America better able to combat the terrorists now that it has, like Israel, its very own occupied territory to police? Is the position of a (relatively speaking) moderate government in nuclear-armed Pakistan more or less secure because the U.S. occupies a Muslim nation?

While intelligent people may disagree about the answers to such questions, it is plain that the Bush administration has carried out one of the most outlandish bait-and-switch operations in diplomatic history—invading and occupying Iraq under the guise of fighting the war against terrorists, when in fact Saddam's Iraq—a vicious and quite secular



regime—had nothing to do with anti-American terrorism.

By this year's end, Americans are likely to know whether the Bush administration has succeeded in planting a viable "pro-Western" government in Iraq. But the uneasy Christmas and threats against Pakistan draw one thing into sharper focus: whether or not the costly Iraq adventure is "victorious," in the war on those who attacked the United States on Sept. 11, it is hardly even a sideshow.

[IMMIGRATION]

BORDERLINE INSANITY

Amnesty is back. On Christmas Eve, the *Washington Post* reported the administration's intent to push a sweeping relaxation of immigration laws in the new year. Drawing on deliberate leaks, the paper explained the plan's two parts: a guest-worker program and "a way for some undocumented workers in the United States to move toward legal status."

Conventional wisdom on both sides will seek the administration's motivation in electoral strategy, the coveted Hispanic vote. And while Karl Rove's participation does point to "Hispandering," there may also be a subtler, and more encouraging, explanation. The evolution of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and an intensifying terrorist threat are making immigration enthusiasts in the executive branch desperate. The binary logic of the security

state holds that illegal aliens must be deported or normalized. And the relentless penetration of security into all aspects of public life inevitably reveals to DHS thousands of specific illegals.

As the Beltway Sniper case shows, such people can commit acts of terror, and if DHS ignores them, it will look feckless and be replaced. Every Orange Alert makes it that much harder to overlook America's 8-12 million illegal aliens and to resist the logic of deportation. This reasonably explains the drive for amnesty, which Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge began two weeks earlier.

True reformers should therefore take heart. The open-borders crowd's jitters were evident in the Christmas announcement. If they lose this fight, they could lose the whole battle on illegal immigration and become vulnerable on legal immigration as well. The historical analogy is Gettysburg, and, as it was for the Union, a modest tactical win could be the decisive victory in the war for immigration reform.

[POSTWAR]

"LIBERATION" THEOLOGY

The same naïveté that supposed Iraqis would greet occupation with flowers and dancing continues to birth new tragedy. On Christmas Eve, Bashir Toma Elias, a Christian in Shi'ite southern Iraq, was shot in the head as he walked home through the Basra bazaar to spend the holiday with his five children. His killer

CAGLE CARLOW www.caglecartoons.com

escaped, but the motive was clear: Elias's liquor business was unacceptable to increasingly powerful Shi'ite militants.

Since the invasion of Iraq, 400 alcohol stores run by Christians have closed. Those that remain are routinely burned and looted. Bashir Elias is not the first owner to be murdered. "We fear for our lives and our interests from the extremist Shiites who are targeting us as Christians," Misak Victor, another alcohol merchant, told Reuters.

While Christians found a measure of tolerance—if not protection—under Saddam's secular nationalism, liberation unleashed the most radical of Islamic furies. Now in a mêlée of militancy and mobocracy, Christian homes are seized, businesses are shuttered, and women are intimidated into wearing Muslim veils. Over 2,000 families have fled Basra's community of 100,000 Christians, leaving behind a city that by the day looks less modeled on Toqueville than Tehran.

[JUDICIARY]

COURTING DIVERSITY

During the election of 2000, Republicans allowed George W. Bush a legion of conservative departures—prescription-drug promises, Spanish stump speeches, Head Start delusions—to win a bigger prize: the courts. He has since disappointed, turning a "humble" foreign policy grandiose, negotiating amnesty for illegal aliens, and expanding federal spending at a pace that leaves Democrats in the dust. But all is forgiven as his loyalists cling to that fading dream of a conservative judiciary.

White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales's keynote address to the American Bar Association's conference on diversity should quash any lingering fantasy. Gonzales said, "[S]ome will argue that diversity is not an appropriate goal," but, on the contrary, Bush believes, "[A]

president who seeks out judicial candidates in a diverse society should ensure that our federal judiciary is highly qualified and diverse. This represents the vision of the federal courts."

Conservatives under the impression that a Bush presidency would yield a harvest of Scalias have a different vision. They never expected ethnic politics to take priority in judicial selection. But Gonzales' ease with the liberal line drew no rebuke. If anything, his activism wins presidential praise—not to mention the likelihood of a Supreme Court nomination.

[DEFENSE]

NO DESERT SHIELD

For the "Republic Not an Empire" file, further proof that America's armed forces aren't designed for indefinite occupation duty.

An Illinois-Iowa National Guard Chinook unit recently deployed to Iraq without required anti-missile defenses. Several years ago, based on the reasonable assumption that Guard units would probably not face hostile fire, the Army ordered just half of the flare-launching systems that Guard Chinooks needed. In this particular unit, only two of 14 were fully outfitted, and on Nov. 2, 2003, one without updated defensive equipment was shot down—at a cost of 16 lives.

Until America assumed an imperial role, Guard deployments were rare and brief enough that equipment could be passed between units with the latest technology sent to active-duty forces on the frontlines. Now that the frontiers of our responsibility have global dimensions, not only are more troops needed, but all fight on the front of a low-grade guerrilla war. Their supply system has not kept pace with that changed tempo, and our poorly outfitted soldiers are paying the price for America's assumption of a mantle she should never wear. ■

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CHRISTIAN CHARITY

Thank you for Pat Buchanan's "Stand Up To Sharon" (Dec. 15). After five visits to the Holy Land (three in the past year), I can only say that American Jews and many well-meaning American Christians have been grossly misled for a very long time. Every person of faith should stand up against the horrible injustices against Palestinian families and communities, including the near disappearance of the Christian community (once 20 percent of the population, now less than 2 percent) from Israel. While we must always denounce the ugly legacy of anti-Semitism, we must equally denounce the unbiblical and undemocratic injustice of land grabs, subjugation of a whole population, and countless human-rights abuses by the Israeli government against the besieged Palestinians.

Thank you, thank you, thank you. This is the best Christmas angelic news I have received in this or any other year. I'm sure Mr. Buchanan will take a lot of criticism from Christians who do not have a full biblical or political understanding of the horrors perpetrated by the Israeli government and paid for by our taxes.

THE REV. MARK E. STANGER
Canon Precentor and Associate Pastor
Grace Cathedral
San Francisco, Calif.

JEWISH CLARITY

I was deeply impressed by Tom Piatak's article on the delegitimization of Christmas in contemporary American society (Jan. 19). Three decades ago, I attended, as an Orthodox Jewish teenager, a public high school in Indianapolis. I have fond memories of the school's annual Christmas concert, which culminated with selections from Handel's "Messiah." One can only hope that the administrators of my *alma mater* have resisted attempts to secularize this event into an innocuous "holiday" program!

As for the "Hebrew Hammer" movie, there is enough in this cinematic nightmare to offend serious practitioners of both Judaism and Christianity. It may well be that the film's secular Jewish producers were angry with Christmas as Piatak suggests. They are equally distressed with authentic Jewish traditions. Like the Jewish-establishment detractors of Mel Gibson, the folks behind "Hebrew Hammer" have done themselves and the entire American Jewish community a tremendous disservice in alienating their Christian neighbors.

Ultimately the secularists who have brazenly reinvented Christmas are after more than a Nativity scene in front of City Hall or a few stanzas of "Silent Night." They wish to overthrow the religious mindset that has made America a relatively tolerant society. We need only to look at France, where religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims face state sanctions in government schools in the name of preserving French liberty, to see where that road will lead us.

DAVID L. BLATT
Chicago, Ill.

SHOUTING STOP

A radical departure from a government's vision of itself and its vision of the world is slow to be recognized and difficult to understand. For this reason we are indebted to C.G. Ryn for his penetrating analysis of the incredible reversal of policy now underway (Jan. 19). From our position as a responsible member of the community of nations, the U.S. now seems to be guided by the conviction that we alone have the answers to many of the world's problems and are bent on imposing our answers on various nations, willing or unwilling, by force if necessary.

But instinctively the American people know that the world is not perfectible. When Bush vows to fight until evil is eliminated from the earth, we recognize

it as a dangerous delusion—one that will involve us in endless wars at incalculable cost and one doomed to failure. The idea that we should act as the world's policeman, solving every problem, righting every wrong, and correcting every injustice is breathtaking in its arrogance and frightening in its implications.

When this new departure involves callous disregard for constitutional safeguards, it's time for a journal such as *TAC* to take over the job of standing astride the tide of history shouting, stop!
BILL MCCARTY
Friendsville, Pa.

VIABLE FEDERALISM

Your editorialist is much too quick to dismiss a "federalist" solution to the marriage-definition crisis in favor of a constitutional amendment. (Jan. 19). Conservatives' kneejerk demands for constitutional amendments display a deplorable lack of political resourcefulness.

Why can the ruling of a few crazed judges in Massachusetts only be corrected by drastic action by Congress and 40 states? Such an amendment, designed to define marriage in traditional terms, will in effect give the federal courts total control over marriage law with untold evil consequences. Conservatives should never willingly endorse an increase of federal power. Further, such drastic action gives undue status to an absurd, contemptible, and usurpative ruling. There is no need to define marriage by constitutional amendment. Centuries of law and millenia of revelation have already established that. The opinion of a few tinpot dictators cannot change that, even if they are called judges.

CLYDE WILSON
Columbia, S.C.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209.

The Year to Come

This will be the year of all the answers. We will learn whether George W. Bush remains president of the United States. His fate will tell us whether the basic

shift in American foreign policy he carried out will last beyond November 2004. We will discover whether the electorate supports pre-emptive and preventive war, mounted when a U.S. administration judges this necessary.

We thus will know whether the Bush administration's National Strategy Statement of September 2002 represented a simple lapse in traditional military policy and ethics or reflects a lasting rupture in how Americans think about the rest of the world. That, in turn, will automatically tell us whether the alliance-based co-operation and constructive multilateralism of U.S. policy since World War II is truly finished.

We will know who has won in Iraq. Iraq's fate is the most important variable in any attempt to assess where the United States will stand a year from now. If a secure and at least nominally sovereign Iraqi government exists a year from today, alongside American bases in that country, the United States will have won the Iraq war.

The possibility that the United States might lose the Iraq war has yet to be seriously discussed at the level of national politics and policy. There is an all but universal assumption that American power will in the end crush anything that resists it. It is true that some critics have warned of a "new Vietnam," but they nearly always do so in terms that suggest only that the eventual victory will be more costly than the Bush government expected.

The Vietnam analogy is wrong in military terms. The insurgents in Iraq are not an organized, disciplined national move-

ment, amply supplied with arms and leadership from a sister country across the border, itself protected by a nuclear power. That was South Vietnam's case, with North Vietnam and China backing the NLF insurrection. The relevant analogy of Vietnam with Iraq is political. The Bush administration's ambition in Iraq is identical to that of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations in Vietnam. It is to find or shape a plausible national movement that will turn the country into a strategic American ally.

In Vietnam, there was from the start a Westernized national force, the Catholic elite and educated middle classes that had run the country when it was a French colony. But they represented too narrow a segment of the population and were too weak to overcome the dynamic, Communist-led National Liberation Movement, which combined peasant nationalism with Marxist utopianism. Frustrated by the failure of Ngo Dinh Diem—the Catholic mandarin and nationalist whom the United States had brought back from American exile and installed in power—to impose himself across the country, the Kennedy administration instigated a military coup and acquiesced in his murder.

It replaced Diem with the first in a series of generals, one after another of whom failed in turn, essentially because they represented the interests and ideas of the United States against Vietnamese nationalism. Eventually the Nixon administration abandoned the last of the generals, Nguyen Van Thieu, and formally withdrew from the war, calling this "Vietnamization." When Saigon fell two

years later, Richard Nixon blamed the U.S. Congress and the liberal press.

The Bush administration, in Iraq, is still looking for its Diem. It ignores the political lesson of Vietnam, which is that no leader in Iraq will be capable of rallying the country, or its major religious or ethnic components (except the minority Kurds), whose program is not national sovereignty, an end to American occupation, and national renewal on Iraq's own terms. That means an Iraq in full control of its resources, its security, and its foreign policy. This is not what the Bush administration wants.

Washington initially projected a two-year democracy-building program under U.S. supervision. Military resistance in the "Sunni triangle," an ominous growth of anti-American tension within the Shi'ite community, and the lack of convincing national leadership caused the administration to decide in November to accelerate the "Iraqization" of the occupation.

Now there is supposed to be an Iraqi government in Baghdad by July, still under overall American suzerainty and with 100,000 U.S. troops still stationed in the country. That does not appeal to Iraq's nationalists. There is debate in the United States over the Iraq invasion, but surprisingly little dissent among U.S. foreign-policy elites, officials, commentators, and presidential candidates concerning the general American policy of intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere, meant to "install democracy." If the administration's Iraq policy fails, not only the Bush presidency will be in jeopardy in 2004. So will this complacent cross-party assumption that *Pax Americana* is America's new destiny. ■

William Pfaff is a columnist for the International Herald Tribune in Paris.


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[man of the year]

American Richelieu

Dick Cheney, the hand behind the throne.

By Georgie Anne Geyer



With the publication of this piece by Georgie Anne Geyer, we respectfully tip our hats to Time magazine's tradition of selecting a figure who, for good or ill, over the past year has had the most dramatic impact on changing the shape of the world in which we live. Washington's putting into practice a new strategic doctrine of pre-emptive war marks a major change in national and world history. In our view, it is a turn that could not have been accomplished without Vice President Cheney. From this magazine's inception, we have argued that this doctrine is contrary to America's best traditions and vital national interests. But its importance cannot be denied.—The Editors

IF THE George W. Bush administration had turned out to be anything resembling a traditional American administration, Dick Cheney would not be our Man of the Year. He would be an important vice president, no doubt about it, for the man has the many talents of that special political species, the veteran American politician from that vast American West who seems always to be leaning up against the wall in the background, watching everyone but saying little. But he would still be essentially the President-in-waiting, too smart to look too expectant and too prescient to look relaxed.

Dick Cheney can also exhibit a good sense of humor, as one day last spring when he was speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations at the Ritz-Carlton. He had just disappeared in one of his "undisclosed locations" acts, and so I got up and asked, tongue in cheek, "There's a certain level of speculation, in Washington, sir—not necessarily that I subscribe to—but that you have been James Bondized. We don't know where you are. We don't know what you're doing. I'd just like to ask you, are you enjoying this, and has this changed your personality? Can you give us any insights?"

The vice president grew more obviously amused as the question progressed, and then he answered, to the delight of the audience, "I'm just sitting here thinking about the analogy to James Bond." He paused. "There are certain features of his lifestyle that I've not been able to avail myself of," he summed up, "to put it in those terms—although I am hopeful."

But the truth behind the importance of Dick Cheney's ascension to the post of the most important vice president in American history—some say the most influential man in America—lies in the unique form of this Bush government. Ingrown, secretive, run by several hand-fuls of men and women who were able

to take over the key positions in the Bush administration without the president really knowing who they all were and what they represented, this administration is most like a royal court. In the words of retired Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who has served in the Pentagon's Undersecretariat for Policy, it is a system characterized by cross-agency cliques, the functional isolation of the professional corps, and groupthink.

In this system, George W. most resembles the many French dauphins come suddenly to the throne—the young, inexperienced prince, with a defense chief who has definite Napoleonic tendencies, and a flowing group of courtiers with their own agendas and loyalties, some to foreign countries and some to secret societies outside the realm. Within this court, Dick Cheney has become George Bush's Cardinal Richelieu.

In an administration that whispers instead of talks, and where the dauphin proudly does not read *Le Monde*, Dick Cheney is the man who whispers first—and usually, last—in the president's ear. It is he who imposes an iron secrecy on the court and he who says, months before the president agrees, that, yes, surely he will run again! It is he who stands at the juncture of all the colliding egos and the catapulting interests, he

who weighs and balances them, he who is the rock around which all the waves collide and flow. It is he whose office ("Call Scooter. Check it with Scooter," they repeat hypnotically at the Pentagon, talking about his top aide, Lewis Libby) is the center of the Iraq-war effort, and it is he, not the president, who disappears when there is a crisis, for the safety of the republic. His staff is huge—upwards of 60 men and women devoted to him as in a cult—and tends not to complement the National Security Council (NSC) or the Pentagon but to replicate their functions, as in a court.

It was Dick Cheney, in those months of the campaign in Texas before "W" won the election, who, as head of the Bush selection committee, brought all his people into the court. Back then, most thought he was a "moderate Republican," largely because he was better mannered than the Gingrich types; but the real non-mystery behind the "mystery" behind Dick Cheney ("What happened to him? Why did he change? How did he get so hard-line?") is that he was always exactly the same man—he was only misperceived.

You do remember Cardinal Richelieu? It was the time of the religious wars in Europe in the 16th century and the era of a weak king, Louis XIII. In 1585, Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal and Duke de Richelieu, was born to a minor noble family and became a priest, a bishop, a cardinal, then France's Secretary of State for foreign affairs in 1616, and, finally, the prime minister of France in 1624. He would go down in history as a man obsessed with bringing order to France under royal authority, and he believed in the divine right of the king and the obedience of the people. Yet, even as he believed in the "light of natural reason," still he remained always the pessimist with regard to human nature and believed fully that the ends justify the means. Horribly overspending for France

on the wars he fostered with Spain and the Huguenots, the *Encyclopedia Britannica* duly states that he "committed war expenditure with little regard for the difficulties of raising revenue and he was given to economic improvisation that was often unsound." In the end, he was a mystic who died believing only in the grandeur of his France.

Dick Cheney had seemed an elder statesman of the Republican Party before George W. came to power. He appeared to be a well-behaved moderate who impressed his Democratic colleagues with his courtesy and his sanity, which can now actually be seen as handmaidens of his bent toward secrecy. But when one looks back into history, Vice President Cheney was always the odd man out in the first Bush administration. It was he who, from his home as defense chief in the Pentagon, dissented constantly on the Soviet Union, calling for a more confrontational positioning. It was he who argued, although not often publicly, for a grouping of democracies as the only way for the U.S. to get along in the world. It was he who did not want to recognize Nelson Mandela in South Africa and, of course, he who put out in 1992 an extraordinary paper on American power, severely embarrassing President Bush-41.

WITHOUT DICK CHENEY AS VICE PRESIDENT, GEORGE W. BUSH WOULD NOT HAVE SET OUT AFTER 9/11 TO TRANSFORM THE MIDDLE EAST.

Most importantly in today's terms—in terms of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the future of America—it was Dick Cheney who brought all the neocon hard-liner Cold Warriors into the Bush administration from the time he went to Texas to assist Governor Bush. This should have been no surprise. The Paul Wolfowitzes, the Richard Perles, the Lewis

Libbys, the Douglas Feiths, the John Boltens were all on his teams, in the Pentagon, at the American Enterprise Institute, and now in "his" administration. Many worked together in the Project for a New American Century, with its 1998 letter to President Clinton urging him to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

Here one finds the secret: Cheney has not changed at all. He was the outsider in the first Bush administration, and today he has the same ideas, only more so. He is the hard-line Hobbesian pessimist in whose blood runs the Wyoming strain, not of the open and free West, but of the suspicious militiaman eyeing the foreigner and his "black helicopters."

It is hardly too much to say that without Dick Cheney as vice president, George W. Bush would not have set out after 9/11 to transform the Middle East in the name of pre-emptive unilateralism, taking on the whole world in the process. Cheney's name repeatedly shows up in papers, reports, and propositions that would not seem to suit his rational and seemingly modest appearances on the political stage in earlier administrations.

Look first at the paper, disregarded by most in the press—if they knew of it at all—as an aberration at the time and then, tellingly, quelled by a severely

embarrassed President George H.W. Bush in 1992. This Defense Planning Guidance issued from the Cheney Pentagon just after the Soviet Union collapsed, when one might reasonably have expected some optimism, is pessimistic and hubristic. It offers, said the *New Republic*, "[A] vision of unbridled U.S. dominance and proposed democratiza-

tion as the only true guarantor of U.S. security." In Russia, there was "the possibility that democracy will fail"; in India, "hegemonic aspiration"; in Communist Asia, there were only "fundamental values, governance and policies decidedly at variance with our own." The United States, therefore, must see that no rival arose, not even any grouping of rivals. It would be a unipolar world, with pre-emption only a step away.

The first President Bush was horrified, and the document was revised, but Paul Wolfowitz's planning staff did not let go: the ideas were recycled into a Regional Defense Strategy and, eventually, into the very basis of the next President Bush's foreign policy, as now Vice President Dick Cheney brought in that staff: Stephen Hadley, Lewis Libby, William Luti, John Bolton, and the rest. The group that had been around him in the '90s and even in the '80s was now together in the idea of democratizing the Arab world at the same time that there was a deep cynicism about the Arabs. ("The only thing that Islam understands is force," is a constantly repeated staple among the neocons.)

"THIS GUY GOES FOR THE **BLACK CAPE FIRST**," SAYS ONE OBSERVER, "NOT WHEN EVERYTHING ELSE HAS FAILED."

Democratizing the Arab world also fulfilled the goals of the many neocons who had worked for years in dedication to Ariel Sharon's "Greater Israel," especially Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, and Elliott Abrams. And here one comes to still another paper, prepared in 1996 by many of these American Likudniks for aspiring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who would successfully kill the Oslo Accords just as he declared. That paper called clearly for an invasion of Iraq and for the "reconfiguration" of the Middle East.

In the old political days, a more traditional administration would have had its open lobbies and more open special-interest gyrations. There would have been arguments over policy and press interviews with the president, vice president, and others. Not in this administration. The positions on the Middle East, whether in the White House or the Pentagon, were filled early on by neocons, and mainstream American officials complain bitterly that they have cut out everyone who does not share their ideology. Meanwhile, the president has self-isolated: he proudly announces he does not read newspapers because he wants his news straight—from his staff, while the vice president occasionally hides from al-Qaeda at "undisclosed locations."

The day before the State of the Union address in February 2003, a very few, very loyal columnists were called to the White House to see the president. This was already nearly unheard-of. But when they got there, the president briefed them but only to be quoted as a "senior administration official." In newspaper manners, this is so bizarre as to be

almost incredible. Once again, what you find is the mysterious, masqueraded posture of a court; one can almost sense the Masons hovering in the background while the Russian tsars shudder at such ideas of change and the Hapsburg heir is assassinated in Sarajevo by the Serbian "Black Hand."

If, of course, 9/11 had never happened, Dick Cheney would not have become such a powerful vice president; nor would he have become—something we know is important to him—our "Man of the Year." But once it happened, he

had his historic team in place, and in the very first days after the disaster, he was the insistent voice criticizing American intelligence before 9/11, setting up new intelligence groupings outside the ring (going to the CIA himself to demand intelligence that fit the neocons' ideas and approving the Office of Special Plans in the civilian Pentagon to funnel special intelligence up to his office), and of course arguing for the war in Iraq.

Today, even when President Bush admits that there was no special al-Qaeda tie with Baghdad, Dick Cheney says there was. And when he speaks, as with so many of the neocons, he speaks the same words with almost a Soviet repetitiveness. *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward quotes him as saying at the first NSC meeting after 9/11, "To the extent we define our task broadly, including those who support terrorism, we must get at the states."

His style is secrets and stealth, more conducive to the Florentine Medicis, one would think, than to the New England Bushes. "This guy goes for the black cape first," says one cogent observer, "not when everything else has failed."

So in the end, where have Dick Cheney's machinations led us? The two wars do not go well; already, the U.S. is cutting back on expectations in Iraq, willing just to get out by spring so the president can be re-elected. Afghanistan and Pakistan teeter. Cheney's ahistorical side shows too well; even though he was apparently an apt political-science student, history teaches that when any power becomes too great, others will automatically gang up against it. Can he possibly not know that every great empire fell within 50 years of its height?

All through his early years, both during the Soviet era and the Gulf War, it was Dick Cheney who bitterly complained about American intelligence. But it now turns out that it was his intelligence that was so badly flawed in this

war that one can scarcely grasp it. His own Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon and other such irregular organizations, designed to bypass traditional institutions, were the ones most egregiously wrong about Iraq. They bought in totally to the WMD illusion, to the bogus al-Qaeda/Iraq link, and to the non-existent “center of terrorism” in Baghdad—in fact, they originated most of it. Ahmad Chalabi was their guy—he was going to take over immediately and open relations with Israel and democratize the whole Middle East. Chalabi was Cheney’s guy, above all, and it was his “intelligence” that was deliberately falsified.

So Dick Cheney turns out to be a true radical—not a moderate Republican. With President Bush-43, he has worked to wipe out the heritage of Father Bush, James Baker, and Brent Scowcroft. When critics opine that Cheney has created his own “empire,” they are far from totally wrong, but it is an empire of irregulars: neocon Cold Warriors baying for another fight, American Likudniks out for Greater Israel, Special Planners, and Special Operations. Almost everything that this vice president has overseen has, interestingly enough, not been accomplished within traditional institutions but rather by creating new ones.

While there is little mystery about what he has actually done, there remains the mystery of how a man from Wyoming should be the epicenter of a scheme so strange, so Machiavellian, so profoundly disaggregated from the American context. But no one should expect Dick Cheney and his group to change. They will not. They will go down fighting, shouting—correction: whispering—that they are right. ■

Georgie Anne Geyer is a nationally syndicated columnist and the author of Guerilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro.

Saddam Takes a Ba’ath

But we still know little about the Iraqi resistance.

By Philip Giraldi

THE CAPTURE OF Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces is surely a significant moment in the war against Iraq, though its impact is almost certainly political rather than tactical, and it might, perversely, actually increase the intensity and scale of Iraqi resistance. In no sense is it the result of improved intelligence gathering, nor is it a victory in the war on terrorism. Without Saddam, a revival of Ba’ath Party fortunes becomes chimerical, forcing Sunni moderates to examine seriously the options that remain to them and making a constitutional settlement more achievable. Saddam in chains also unifies, empowers, and legitimizes the beleaguered Iraqi Governing Council as it prepares to pass judgment on the Iraqi dictator’s years of misrule and oppression. Most significant of all, the political prospects of President George W. Bush have been measurably strengthened. Saddam as a tangible symbol of victory enables the Bush administration to show-trial the crimes of the Iraqi dictator as lead-up to America’s own elections, turning the Iraq-war liability into an asset.

The capture of Saddam reveals much about the capabilities and limitations of U.S. operational intelligence in Iraq. Every intelligence officer knows that most breakthroughs against impossibly hard targets are the result of *deus ex machina*, an unanticipated providential intervention. Cold War Soviet spies were mostly volunteers who co-operated with the West for their own reasons, not because they had been assiduously courted, developed, and recruited by an

American case officer. Terrorist cells are rarely penetrated, and when they are it is because someone has unexpectedly stepped forward to provide the critical information, not because of astute planning and execution by Washington.

Because good, sustainable intelligence must of necessity be based on an established group of agents that are carefully tested and evaluated, the problem with relying on random bursts of information provided by volunteers is that the flow of intelligence cannot be managed or relied upon. The volunteers, referred to as “walk ins,” can provide pure gold, but they much more often market information that is deliberately or unintentionally false. Many are motivated by money or are seeking revenge on someone or some group. They tie up resources. Their information is more often than not fabricated or useless, but when there is little else to rely upon, they are ignored at one’s peril. This has been the American dilemma in Iraq—the lack of a good intelligence network on the ground leads to untoward reliance on uncontrolled and untested sources who volunteer questionable information.

Saddam was reportedly captured when a slighted member of the Ba’athist inner circle took his revenge and revealed the Iraqi leader’s whereabouts. Contrary to press accounts, Saddam had no compromising documents on his person when taken. Subsequently, the son of a general executed for disloyalty volunteered the information on the organization of the resistance that was exploited by U.S. forces to make a series

of arrests immediately after the capture. Both men came from Saddam's hometown and were members of his extended family or clan. In response to the two betrayals, Ba'athist insurgents assumed the worst case and scattered, relocating cells and scrapping operations to protect themselves from American raids. Subsequent incursions by the U.S. military have been largely ineffective. Will there

The nature of the resistance remains the core issue. The U.S. military knows little about whom it is fighting. Confusion is evident in the painfully convoluted and contradictory explanations for the persistence of the insurgency. There may be as many as five distinct resistance groups, including Saddam-loyalist Ba'athists, former army officers, Islamists, Ansar al-Islam, and foreign jihadis,

trated in Sunni regions, and most strongly in Ba'athist strongholds, but it has not been confined to those areas. Attacks have taken place against coalition forces in predominantly Shi'ite areas in Baghdad, Karbala, and Basra.

Many Iraqis hate Saddam, but they dislike the occupation forces even more. Apart from the Kurds, who have their own agenda for courting the U.S., hatred of the occupation and questioning of its motives is widespread. Indeed, the resistance to the American occupation may actually broaden and become more diversified as many Iraqis who demurred at fighting for Saddam may find it more palatable to fight to expel the Americans and restore sovereignty to a legitimized Saddam-less Iraq. There are signs that the Shi'ites, nearly two-thirds of the population and unwilling to resist on behalf of Saddam, may do so for a new nation led by Shi'ite clerics. Lacking Saddam, the various resistance groups may also be willing to co-operate more closely against the occupying powers. Former government officials and ex-army officers are already dealing directly with foreign terrorists.

For post-Saddam Iraq, problems appear to be numerous, while solutions are few. The increasingly decentralized insurgency is fighting for God and country as well as for national honor, betrayed most recently through the pusillanimous surrender of Saddam. For the U.S. to win, the one-third of the Iraqi people represented by the disenfranchised and hopeless Sunnis must be given a defined political space to wean them away from armed insurgency and the lure of a national resistance. Without the Sunnis serving as a catalyst, the Shi'ites would be less inclined to take up arms, leaving a truncated resistance to the less numerous Islamists and their foreign allies. ■

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THE NATURE OF THE RESISTANCE REMAINS THE CORE ISSUE. THE U.S. MILITARY KNOWS LITTLE ABOUT WHOM IT IS FIGHTING.

be any other significant intelligence windfall linked to the capture? Probably not, unless the example of the two insiders who betrayed Saddam proves contagious and others decide that their own personal or family interests correspond with those of the coalition.

Widespread commentary suggesting either that Saddam himself will prove to be a major source of new information or that the resistance will wither without his leadership is fatuous. Saddam may have detailed knowledge of weapons programs that will help the White House if it chooses to revisit the causes of the war, but the political problem of the genesis of the war is largely moot. It is more likely than not that Saddam, if he co-operates, will have little to contribute and that the substantial body of evidence indicating that weapons programs and ties to terrorists did not exist will prevail. Suggestions that Saddam headed a well-planned resistance to the coalition, that his army faded away by design to continue the struggle by other means, are also fanciful. Saddam, unable to communicate and on the run, scurrying from bolt hole to bolt hole, could not direct the resistance and was not well informed regarding it. If widespread centralized opposition had been planned, it is curious that there is no solid evidence for it.

nationalists, and pan-Arabs. Several may be acting together on an operational level and others co-operating in an *ad hoc* fashion, without detailed planning or organization. Most may be relying on local financial resources and on the large stockpiles of weapons and trained men to be found throughout the country. Al-Qaeda is encouraging jihadi action against the U.S. and has committed resources to the struggle, but it may not be controlling or directing action ostensibly being taken on its behalf. Devastating suicide attacks against police and coalition partners may shift to target U.S. convoys as al-Qaeda becomes more comfortable with the operating environment and assumes a larger role.

The resort to sledgehammer air strikes and artillery barrages by the U.S. military is the sure sign of a failure in intelligence as the counterinsurgency effort becomes broader and punishes the guilty, suspect, and innocent alike. Civilian deaths are seedbeds for resistance. House demolitions, mass arrests, and midnight raids featuring terrified women and children call to mind the Israeli model, which has not pacified the West Bank and Gaza despite nearly 40 years of trying. Iraq may well become a country up in arms against an invader. To be sure, the resistance has been concen-

[excellence in broadcasting]

How to Lose Your Job in Talk Radio

Clear Channel gags an antiwar conservative.

By Charles Goyette

IMAGINE THESE STARTLING headlines with the nation at war in the Pacific six months after Dec. 7, 1941: "No Signs of Japanese Involvement in Pearl Harbor Attack! Faulty Intelligence Cited; Wolfowitz: Mistakes Were Made."


Or how about an equally disconcerting World War II headline from the European theater: "German Army Not Found in France, Poland, Admits President; Rumsfeld: 'Oops!,' Powell Silent; 'Bring 'Em On,' Says Defiant FDR."

It seems to me that when there is reason to go to war, it should be self-evident. The Secretary of State should not need to convince a skeptical world with satellite photos of a couple of Toyota pickups and a dumpster. And faced with a legitimate *casus belli*, it should not be hard to muster an actual constitutional declaration of war. Now in the absence of a meaningful Iraqi role in the 9/11 attack and the mysterious disappearance of those fearsome Weapons of Mass Destruction, there might be some psychic satisfaction to be had in saying, "I told you so!" But it sure isn't doing my career as a talk-show host any good.

The criterion of self-evidence was only one of dozens of objections I raised before the elective war in Iraq on my

afternoon drive-time talk show on KFYI in Phoenix. Many of the other arguments are familiar to readers of *The American Conservative*.

But the case for war was a shape-shifter, skillfully morphing into a new rationale as quickly as the old one failed to withstand scrutiny. For a year before the war, I scrambled to keep up with the latest incarnations of the neocon case. Most were pitifully transparent and readily exposed. (Besides the aluminum tubes and the trailers that had Bush saying, "Gotcha," does anyone remember those death-dealing drones? Never have third-world, wind-up, rubber-band, balsa-wood airplanes instilled so much fear in so many people.) Still, my management didn't like my being out of step with the president's parade of national hysteria, and the war-fevered spectators didn't care to be told they were suffering illusions. So after three years, I was replaced on my primetime talk show by the Frick and Frack of Bushophiles, two giggling guys who think everything our tongue-tied president does is "Most excellent, dude!" I have been relegated to the later 7–10 p.m. slot, when most people, even in a congested commuting market like Phoenix, are already home watching TV.



Charles Goyette

Why did this happen? Why only a couple of months after my company picked up the option on my contract for another year in the fifth-largest city in the United States, did it suddenly decide to relegate me to radio Outer Darkness? The answer lies hidden in the oil-and-water incompatibility of these two seemingly disconnected phrases: "Criticizing Bush" and "Clear Channel."

Criticizing Bush? Well then, must I be some sort of rug-chewing liberal? Not even close. As a boy, I stood on the grass in a small Arizona town square when Barry Goldwater officially began his

1964 presidential run. And I was there for the last official event of the Goldwater campaign. My job was to recruit and manage my fellow junior-high and high-school conservatives in a phone bank operation, calling supporters to fill up as many buses as possible to help pack the stadium—a show of strength for the

paings, including the National Conservative Political Action Committee. Despite my disappointment in Goldwater for not supporting Reagan, I was there when a small band of the faithful—no more than four or five of us—gathered for a potluck dinner to support the creation of a brand-new public-policy think tank

nel stations were unusually visible during the war with what corporate flacks now call “pro-troop rallies.” In tone and substance, they were virtually indistinguishable from pro-Bush rallies. I’m sure the administration, which faced a host of regulatory issues affecting Clear Channel, was not displeased.

I’M A TALK-SHOW WAR CASUALTY. MY CONTRACT EXPIRES IN A FEW MORE MONTHS AND—MY ICONOCLASM BEING NOTED—IT IS NOT LIKELY IT WILL BE RENEWED.

nation’s television viewers. Of course that’s an insignificant role to play in a presidential campaign, but it was pretty heady stuff for a 14-year-old kid from Flagstaff.

I broke with Goldwater in 1976 over his decision to back Gerald Ford instead of Ronald Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination. Ford was a perfectly decent, if ordinary, Republican (who could have taught the big-spending W. Bush a thing or two about the use of the veto!). But I took my conservatism seriously. Reagan was clearly the champion of the conservative cause.

Perhaps I’m just anti-military? No. I am proud of my honorable service and of the Army Commendation Medal I was awarded. I also spent a good deal of time in the 1980s as a member of the Speakers Bureau of High Frontier, promoting Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, a defense policy unlike today’s in that it was actually designed to defend the American people.

I have been a Republican precinct committeeman; my county Republican Party elected me its “Man of the Year” in 1988; I have written speeches for conservative candidates and office holders; and I have been employed by statewide and national political organizations and cam-

named after “Mr. Conservative.” The enterprise blossomed, and I was honored several months ago to serve as Master of Ceremonies for the Goldwater Institute’s 15th Anniversary Gala.

I can assure you then that my criticism of Bush has been on the basis of long-held conservative principles. It begins with respect for the wisdom of the Founders and the Constitution’s division of power and delegation of authority, and extends to an adherence to the principles of governmental restraint and fiscal prudence. It proved to be a message that was more than a little inconvenient for my employer.

Clear Channel Communications, the 800-pound gorilla of the radio business, owns an astonishing 1,200 stations in 50 states, including Newstalk 550 KFYI in Phoenix, where I do the afternoon program ... or did until last summer. The principals of Clear Channel, a Texas-based company, have been substantial contributors to George W. Bush’s fortunes since before he became president. In fact, Texas billionaire Tom Hicks can be said to be the man who made Bush a millionaire when he purchased the future president’s baseball team, the Texas Rangers. Tom Hicks is now vice chairman of Clear Channel. Clear Chan-

Criticism of Bush and his ever-shifting pretext for a first-strike war (what exactly was it we were pre-empting anyway?) has proved so serious a violation of Clear Channel’s cultural taboo that only a good contract has kept me from being fired outright. Roxanne Cordonier, a radio personality at Clear Channel’s WMYI 102.5 in Greenville, S.C., didn’t have it as good. Cordonier, who worked under the name Roxanne Walker, was the South Carolina Broadcasters Association’s 2002 Radio Personality of the Year. That apparently wasn’t enough for Clear Channel. Her lawsuit against the company alleges that she was belittled on the air and reprimanded by her station for opposing the invasion of Iraq. Then she was fired.

They couldn’t really fire me, at least without paying me a substantial sum of money, but I was certainly belittled on the air for opposing the war. The other KFYI talk-show hosts—so bloodthirsty that they made Bush apologists and superhawks Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity sound moderate—vilified me almost daily. As a former radio-station owner myself, it was a little hard to believe management would allow one of their key hosts to be trashed day in and day out on their own airwaves. After all, we sell radio time on the basis of its ability to influence people’s behavior. A wiser programming approach would have been to showcase me as an object of curiosity, with a challenge to listeners to see if they could discover where I had gone wrong or how I was missing the imminent threat Iraq posed to the American people. No doubt the con-

stant vilification I received and my heterodoxy on the war cost me audience during the interlude. It was certainly enough to get pictures of me morphing into those of the French president posted on the Free Republic Web site during the “freedom fries” silliness. A banner there read, “Boycott Charles Chirac Goyette at KFYI radio Phoenix, AZ! Protest against the Charles Goyette Show from 4-7pm at KFYI for his leftist subversive [*sic*] Bush-bashing rants. Turn off KFYI radio for the Charles Goyette Show! No liberal scum talk shows on KFYI!” Radio does provoke people, doesn’t it?

One Clear Channel executive had me take an unexpected day off for the sin of reporting the breaking news on March 27, 2003, that neocon hawk Richard Perle, of the Defense Policy Board, had relinquished his chairmanship under scrutiny of his business dealings and for blaspheming that Donald Rumsfeld was the worst Secretary of Defense since Robert McNamara. So great were these transgressions that the radio gods themselves must have been aghast at my impiety. I explained in conference-room confrontations that both positions were completely respectable points of view. The comparison with McNamara had been made repeatedly in subsequent days in the mainstream media. I specifically cited “The McLaughlin Group” the following Friday and the *New York Times* the following Monday, and in describing the Perle resignation, I relied upon details from both Seymour Hersh in the *New Yorker* and from syndicated columnist Arianna Huffington. “Well, then,” they explained, the problem was “the emotionalism” of my remarks. Imagine that, emotionalism in talk radio? I reminded them that for years we had run promotions identifying KFYI as “the Place with More Passion,” where the Charles Goyette Show was positioned as “Fearless Talk Radio!”

Clear Channel made it clear—“With you, I feel like I’m managing the Dixie Chicks,” said my program director—that they would have liked to fire me anyway. While a well-drafted contract made that difficult, it did not prevent them from tucking me away outside prime time.

So I’m a talk-show war casualty. My contract expires in a few more months and—my iconoclasm being noted—it is not likely it will be renewed. Among the survivors at my station: one host who wanted to nuke Afghanistan (he bills himself as “your voice of reason and moderation”) and another who upon learning that 23-year-old Mideast peace activist Rachel Corrie had been run over by an Israeli bulldozer shouted, “Back up and run over her again!” As he doesn’t quite get some of the important distinctions in these debates, such as that Iranians should not be called Arabs, we would hope that he’s not taken too seriously. Likewise my replacements in the afternoon drive slot, brought in for glamorizing the war and billed as “The Comedy Channel meets Talk Radio.” If you remember the “Saturday Night Live”

skit “Superfans” with Mike Myers and Chris Farley—“Who’s stronger, God or da Bulls?” “Da Bulls!”—then you get the idea. Only instead of “da Bulls,” it’s three hours every afternoon of “da Bush!” Expect to hear more insightful topics like “So Who’s Tougher: Michael Jordan or Donald Rumsfeld?”

I’ve seen how war fever infects a people. And I was in a no-win situation, with an audience pre-screened by virtue of 11 hours a day of screaming war frenzy—unlistenable for the uninfected—that surrounded my time slot. So I knew there would be a personal price for opposing the war, and I was prepared to pay it. But as a lover of the rough and tumble of public debate and the contest of ideas, I am disappointed at what is happening in my industry. At least at Clear Channel, there’s only one word for the belief that talk radio is still a fair and fearless search for the truth: “Un-Bull-ieveable!” ■

Charles Goyette was named “Best Talk Show Host of 2003” by the Phoenix New Times.

Zapatista Fashionistas

Chloe Sevigny and the Chiapas hipsters

By Dana B. Vachon

THE KARMA OF GOLD BULLION still lives in the rafters of Capitale and falls through the air down onto the crowded floor at the Lower East Side Girls Club Benefit. It settles disproportionately upon the evening’s celebrity benefactor, actress Chloe Sevigny. She sits one plate to my right. Gold snakes wind about her fingers and up her arms as silver silk floats upon her body. The fluid dress comes to

an Elizabethan collar at the neck. I’ve never been quite this close to an It Girl.

At a podium, awards are given to the patrons of the Girls Club by a gothic hipster emcee. Steel spikes pierce through her cheeks, and a pair of pendulous weights test the strength of her stretched earlobes. She gives everyone who has helped the charity a wooden Greek column that looks as if it might be of

some use in crushing mint leaves and ice for vodka southsides. I point this out to Chloe, who looks at me with two of the heaviest eyes that I have ever seen.

The collective ennui of every period of indulgence from Versailles to Silicon Valley flows from between her eyelashes as the pink and orange lights of the room meet in her hair, which is pulled up and draped about itself Aphrodite-style. Odysseus would have ordered his men to bind and blindfold him in the presence of such a siren. But I am not half the man Odysseus was and could have gazed on all night had I not been blinded by a small Mexican girl playing with the flash of a camera.

When I regained my sight, I looked across the table to see an entire family of Mexican peasants. Someone had

Girl? Some might look to radical chic. Others, pure goodwill. The answer was far simpler: they all had really hip tribal outfits.

Chloe stared wantonly at the cascading beaded silks of purple and blue. She seemed so satisfied with the folk couture that I wondered if it was part of a new clothing line.

"Did you design their outfits?" I asked.

She flipped the air with a motion of her hand and scoffed, "I wish I had that talent."

Sevigny looked so profound in her heavy-eyed, avant-garde, Elizabethan-geisha gear that I had to consider the possibility that she had very quietly become to the Zapatistas in Chiapas what Leonard Bernstein had once been to the Black Panthers. I reveled in the

to assuage bourgeois guilt. In the puzzling epoch of the celebutante, you don't need to be anything (certainly not radical) to be chic. The Great Society was a bust, affirmative action is dying, and so are the unions. But everyone gets to be on television.

I sat transfixed between the It Girl and the Zapatista hipsters. The table seemed to spin in the wake of a shadow-puppet culture as enthralled with artifice as it is divorced from reality. We have grown magically capable of promoting the starving plight of Third World Separatists and the luxurious angst of indie starlets at the same table in the same room of the same benefit without a single trace of irony.

But irony never dies.

"Do you think that Subcomandante Marcos could be downtown chic with his whole hidden identity thing?" I asked Chloe.

"Yes."

"If you had to be kidnapped by one Latin American leftist movement, would you pick the Zapatistas or the FARC?"

She was unsure and seemed unable to decide how a FARC hipster would stack up against the Zapatistas in their beautiful outfits. I threw in another choice: the Shining Path. They have a funky name, and she made up her mind very quickly:

"The Shining Path."

At the podium the emcee of many piercings formally recognized the family at our table:

"What I want people here to understand is that we have people here from Chiapas!"

She gestured toward them as the *nouveau chic* offered their applause. The smallest child of the family, a four-year-old boy, was the only person in any way attuned to the grand absurdity. He covered his ears and shook his head. ■

Dana B. Vachon writes from New York City.

WE HAVE GROWN MAGICALLY CAPABLE OF PROMOTING THE STARVING PLIGHT OF THIRD WORLD SEPARATISTS AND THE LUXURIOUS ANGST OF INDIE STARLETS AT THE SAME TABLE.

made the fatal error of giving the children sugar and photographic equipment. They squirmed in their seats, taking pictures of each other, the walls, the ceiling, the floor, and, most painfully, my retinas. The mother's face was filled with a gravity that explained the creased, sun-worn leather of her skin, and the apparent absence of any father.

"Who are they?" I asked Chloe.

"They're from Chiapas. They're on tour."

Somewhere in the renegade Mexican state of Chiapas, masked Zapatista revolutionaries knocked down the door of an abandoned adobe and wondered where its former occupants had gone. How did a family cast so far down by the rigid caste system of modern Mexico come to be fêted by the downtown It

delicious thought of the Indie-film darling coming to the aid of the Indian freedom fighters.

"Have you been to Chiapas?" I asked.

"No."

"Well, do you think that they should have their own state?"

She shrugged her shoulders. Not sure.

Across the table, the family's adolescent son forgot the agrarian struggle entirely and lost himself in the capitalist charms of a leggy model who shared his seat. His earthy pheromones seemed to infect her. They laughed and cooed.

Orwellian magic was at work, and the peasant family became more fashionista than Zapatista amidst plates of uneaten prosciutto and Atkins-eschewed bread. At one time they might have been a proletarian symbol tapped by liberal elites

[anticlimax]

Hef's Baby

Playboy's abortion activism played out.

By Paul Belien

DESPITE ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY, *Playboy* is in swifter decline than the virility of Hugh Hefner, its 77-year-old founder. Its circulation has been in freefall since its 20th anniversary in 1973, and raising it again has proved impossible—in spite of its playmates' showing ever more. Nevertheless, the golden anniversary is drawing considerable media attention. What Henry Ford was to transportation, Alexander Graham Bell to communication, and Bill Gates to computerization, Hugh Hefner was to self-stimulation.

Playboy started in 1953 when Hefner acquired the rights to a nude picture of Marilyn Monroe (with her legs closed). She was the first in a long series of centerfolds that became the cherished possessions of millions of young men. Hefner built a media empire on the male adolescent's natural curiosity about female anatomy. He sees himself as a benefactor to humanity. "Every time you ask him/ The answer's the same/ Sex would never have happened/ Without Hef in the game," rhymed his former mistress Carrie Leigh.

When 27-year-old "Hef" printed the 70,000 copies of the first *Playboy* in December 1953, he did not put much faith in his enterprise. The first issue bore no date because Hefner was not sure when, or if, there would be a second one. He thought it would take several months to sell. Much to his sur-

prise, the first issue sold in less than a week. One month later, Hefner had a second issue ready, and a few years on he was so rich that he could let others compile the magazine while he padded about in silk smoking jackets.

Playboy was an immediate success. "It was the right idea in the right place at the right time," Hefner stated in an anniversary interview in his magazine (January 1974). "A great many of the traditional social and moral values of our society were changing, and *Playboy* was the first publication to reflect those changes. We offered an alternative lifestyle with a more permissive, more play-and-pleasure orientation. *Playboy* offered a new set of ethical values for the urban society. The editorial message came through loud and clear: Enjoy yourself."

Hefner noted correctly that the success of his magazine was due to changing values, and he made *Playboy* an instrument to promote these changes and thus alter the traditional order. "*Playboy*," said Hefner in 1974, "is one of the most important and influential magazines in the world, in terms of the impact it's had not only on social mores but as a champion of individual rights. We've supported countless civil liberties organizations, political reform, sex research and education, abortion reform before it became popular, prison reform, and the continuing campaign to

reform our repressive sex and drug laws ..."

Changing the social fabric was the business that most interested America's porn purveyor. In July 1955, Hefner had the brilliant idea of asking an ordinary girl, Charlene Karalus, *Playboy's* subscription manager, to pose. Until then, the playmates had been professional models. In January 1994, he explained the ideological aim of the Karalus pictures: "If the girl next door would pose in such an erotic context, the significance seemed clear. If the girls-next-door were sexually aware and active, as depicted in a monthly pictorial feature in the center of an increasingly popular men's magazine, traditional Christian values might be perceived as being in serious jeopardy."

The readers loved it. Karalus became the most popular playmate of the '50s, after Hefner changed her name. Charlene Karalus did not serve his subversive agenda, but the pseudonym he provided—Janet Pilgrim—did. "I chose the name 'Pilgrim' precisely because of its puritan connotations, which I thought would help to deliver our editorial message—that nice girls were sexual beings, too, including a puritan daughter named Pilgrim. Rather quickly I realized that I had in this Playmate feature a symbol for attacking the double-standard hypocrisy of our society."

Karus was one of Hefner's mis-

tresses at that time (“I had sex with any of the female staff members who were interested”), when his wife Millie was pregnant with his second child. Hefner, who already had a one-year-old daughter, did not want another baby. He writes,

I wasn’t thrilled, but Millie seemed resigned. It seemed to me that from the moment children were introduced into a marriage, the entire relationship was altered: Parenting replaced romance as the dominant theme in the relationship. In my youthful naïveté, I had envisioned marriage as the apex of romance for a couple in love. But that naïveté on my part had died a cruel death, and I was finding it increasingly difficult to honor the conventions of society rather than to follow my own convictions.

Hefner’s son, who was born shortly afterwards, owed his life to Mommy’s “resignation” and to the fact that, at that time, abortion was still illegal. But Daddy, who preferred “romance” to playing with the kids, decided to give other men the opportunity to “follow their convictions.” The liberalization of abortion became the dominant theme in the social-engineering project of the social activist in silk pajamas.

Playboy was the first widely distributed American magazine that openly promoted abortion on demand. It did so, the magazine wrote in January 1979, “on the grounds that women have the same rights as men to control their own bodies and to choose whether or not to bear children.” Hefner provided funds and lawyers for women demanding their right to abortion. In this way, he was involved in the cases brought before the Supreme Court, resulting in its decision to legalize abortion on Jan. 22, 1973.

Indeed, the annual report of the Playboy Foundation published in January 1974 starts in a triumphant vein: “The

Playboy Foundation participated in a movement that won a major court victory. The victory came with last January’s Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. This was especially gratifying because of the Foundation’s long campaign for reform, which began in 1966. The Foundation will remain alert to attempts by anti-abortion forces in state or local governments to limit the availability of abortion through restrictive guidelines or policies.”

Letters in the “Forum” section of the magazine indicated that *Playboy*’s stance on abortion was the most controversial issue among its readers. Up until the late-’80s, when “Forum” changed its outlook and the editors suppressed the debate, there was a continuing argument over abortion.

Two things stand out: the first is the continuing attempt on the part of *Playboy*’s editors to reduce all arguments against abortion to religious considerations, which, the magazine reasons, in a democratic society obviously cannot be forced upon those who do not share these spiritual sentiments. The second is the hard-boiled, economic calculation of

to the community. A random sample of those incarcerated in our prisons and mental institutions will reveal that most were unwanted children.” In September 1983, Steve Kidder from Anchorage, Alaska wrote, “[I]t costs about \$100,000 to raise a child to the age of 18. ... An abortion costs less than \$1,000.” Consequently, he said, “[A]bortion is a plus, socially and economically.”

Not all readers agreed. In April 1979, an anonymous lady from Kansas wrote, “What miserable and self-serving people we have become to arrogantly declare that someone should not be born because he ‘doesn’t stand a good chance.’ We’re talking about *life*, damn it! It’s the *only* sacred thing there is. Leave God, religion, the Bible and holy wars out of it. I’ve borne babies and all baby-related hassles. I’ve survived, they’ve survived and we’ve been graced by the simple fact that we’re *alive with one another* in all our ups and downs. And I even share that with the baby I gave up for adoption 18 years ago.”

Mark Hanson from British Columbia was also angered by the editors’ claim in the September 1978 issue that their

THE LIBERALIZATION OF ABORTION BECAME THE DOMINANT THEME IN THE SOCIAL-ENGINEERING PROJECT OF THE SOCIAL ACTIVIST IN SILK PAJAMAS.

many pro-abortionists: an unwanted child is said to cost the welfare state too much.

In February 1982, an anonymous reader from New York wrote that “unwanted fetuses, upon reaching the age of 16 or so, may well be living off the great welfare teat.” In the same issue, Dr. Ezekiel Barber from Union, N.J., wrote, “Every child needs to be wanted and loved, lest he or she become a menace

arguments were based on reason and not on passion. “Playboy accuses anti-abortionists of ‘waging a modern-day holy war.’ But surely the shoe is on the other foot. In a holy war, e.g. a Moslem jihad, innocent lives are taken. It is the pro-abortionists, not their opponents, who take innocent lives, and so it is they who wage a ‘holy war’ (to use your cliché). And guess what? Many of us are atheists.”

In June 1979, a reader from Indiana wrote, "I'm tired of hearing how the anti-abortionists are stupid people. All we ask is that a woman be responsible for her own actions and her own body. Babies don't ask to be conceived and there are thousands of couples waiting to adopt the children." In addition, he wrote, there are the psychological effects of abortion: "More women's lives are ruined by abortion than by childbirth." The editors responded by observing, "If you wish not to be labeled stupid, you should concede that a woman's responsibility for her own body includes the right to have sex without having to bear unwanted children and that the traumatic effects of abortion are a myth, except perhaps among women who have been taught from childhood that they do *not* have the right to control their own bodies."

A Canadian reader criticized this response. He pointed out that birth control and not abortion is the appropriate method to avoid unwanted children. *Playboy* replied, "[N]o ordinary form of contraception is so desirable or effective that it will avoid all unwanted pregnancies. Moreover, some people are too stupid to use contraceptives. But that would be no reason to make abortions illegal or for taxpayers to support more unwanted, unloved children."

In January 1982, reader John Zimmerman from Tucson, Ariz., attempted to develop a nonideological and reason-based argument against abortion. "Anything worthwhile and pleasurable involves risk," he wrote, "be it hang gliding, roller skating or sex." Abortion is a "method of 'changing the score' after the game has been played. Too many people are opting for merely the simplest way out. But the heavyweight rationalization is worse: that unwanted pregnancies can be tallied in dollars and cents and abortion spares an unwanted baby from being born into 'hostile conditions' or

from being subjected to a 'living hell of inadequate food, housing and medical care and to actual physical and mental abuse.' Honestly, do you know a person who, because of the horrible conditions he or she was born into, seriously wishes that he or she had been aborted?"

The editors dismissed Zimmerman's arguments: "You've simply rephrased one side to rhetorically ask why more people don't commit suicide. Your own

two decades, the company has made only meager profits and has even been losing money the past three years. Total sales have slipped to 3.1 million copies—as opposed to the record 7.2 million copies sold in late 1972, when abortion was still illegal.

Some suspect that *Playboy* is losing its appeal because the girls in other skin magazines spread their legs wider. On cable TV, however, which is the com-

IT WAS PHRASED IN A LANGUAGE THAT **PLAYBOY COULD UNDERSTAND:**

"KEEP TELLING PEOPLE THAT **KILLING A FETUS IS MORAL** AND EVENTUALLY THERE WILL BE **NO ONE LEFT TO READ YOUR MAGAZINE.**"

anti-abortion position is even stranger than the ones we have postulated. We can understand (while disagreeing with) the theological position that procreation is the ultimate purpose of sex and, therefore, abortion is sinful; but defending accidental pregnancy on the basis of risk strikes us as weird. And not even sporting when you consider that the risk is limited to the female players."

There was, however, one argument against abortion that the magazine did not counter. It was first employed by Richard Greene in February 1973, the first issue after the legalization of abortion. It was brief, to the point, and phrased in a language that *Playboy* could understand: dollars and cents. "Keep telling people that killing a fetus is moral and eventually there will be no one left to read your magazine."

Today, *Playboy* is the concern of 49-year-old Christie Hefner, Hugh's daughter. She has been running the company since 1988, when her father retired with his seven blonde mistresses. Christie is a businesswoman, not an ideologue, and conducts her work in a suit, not in her nightgown. Nevertheless, over the past

pany's main business today, *Playboy* has moved into hard-core porn without improving its figures. Hence, there might be another, more fundamental, reason for *Playboy's* flagging performance: perhaps Richard Greene was right.

There is some irony in comments Christie Hefner recently made to CNN that "our licensing division's primary audience is 18 to 25 years old" and that "we skew to a young demographic." Equally ironic is *Business Week's* assertion that "the demographic of men age 18 to 34" is what *Playboy* is after. If half the 1.6 million children aborted annually in the U.S. since 1973 are male, *Playboy* now lacks 12 million potential customers in the 15-30 year age group, and this company that advocated the annihilation of a large segment of its audience is now paying a high price for its social activism. ■

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[fear in the faculty lounge]

The New Commissars

Congress threatens to cut off funding to collegiate Mideast Studies departments that refuse to toe the neocon line.

By Anders Strindberg

UNIVERSITIES ARE NO STRANGERS to disagreement and debate. In fact, the process of argumentation has always been an important way for academics to sharpen theories and refine analyses—be it in biology, economics, or political science.

Not so in the field of international studies, claim the intellectual cadres of the neoconservative movement, who have long been bitter about the underrepresentation of their worldview within academia. This imbalance, they claim, is not due to any weaknesses in their arguments but to the fact that U.S. universities in general, and departments studying the Middle East in particular, constitute a monolithic cabal of America-hating left-wing extremists with whom debate is impossible. Academia must be brought to heel.

Taking advantage of the fears and anxieties following 9/11, and their current political clout in Washington, neocon think tanks have waged a three-part battle against the academy. First it was necessary to popularize the view of universities across the country as an unmitigated breeding ground for “terrorist thought.” This was accompanied by the monitoring of scholars and institutions that expressed criticism of Israel and of U.S. foreign policy (i.e., “anti-Semitic” and “anti-American” views),

“naming and shaming” them on the Internet and in columns and editorials. While thus “raising public awareness,” Congress was being lobbied for legislation to confront the threat from this enemy within: the fifth column in the ivory tower.

The pieces came together on Oct. 21, when the House approved the International Studies in Higher Education Act, HR 3077. If passed into law, the bill would mandate the withdrawal of federal funding from international-studies departments that fail to display sufficient support for U.S. foreign-policy positions, do not contribute to homeland security, or fall short of federally mandated standards for “diversity” of political perspectives.

The language of diversity may be a clever sales pitch, but HR 3077 is all about failure to tolerate disagreement. The depiction of university politics that underpins the bill is deceptive to say the least. While academia is doubtless more left-leaning than many other professional environments, it is by no means the extremist left-wing monolith that the neocons claim. In reality, some institutions tend to be critical of U.S. policy and others not; some tend to support Arab positions, while others express sympathy for Israel. Some engage in “leftist” post-colonial studies, others in

quantitative survey work, and other still in “rightist” political-culture studies. There is great diversity of perspectives, and the debate between them enriches academic inquiry and improves the general knowledge base. This is what has made the U.S. home to many of the finest academic institutions in the world.

Federal funding of international studies—known as Title VI funding—dates back to 1965, when the tensions of the Cold War created a need for greater understanding of the world. The government decided to contribute funding to universities that would enable them to pursue in-depth research and education on particular regions, their politics, customs, and languages. A requirement for Title VI funding was that the recipient departments disseminate their knowledge to schools, businesses, industry, and government through outreach activities. Scholarly matters, such as theoretical preferences and composition of curricula, were left entirely to the departments themselves. Even though the funding program was established at a time when fear of communism and the Soviet threat was peaking, the personal political views of academics were not an issue.

The politicization of Title VI funding came about when pro-Israel interest

groups grew concerned with criticism of that country. In one of the earliest and most notorious examples, the Near Eastern Studies Center at the University of Arizona stood accused by the Tucson Jewish Community Council (TJCC) of anti-Israel bias in their outreach material. The center was exonerated by two independent inquiries, but as part of an acrimonious process that dragged on for several years in the early 1980s, the TJCC demanded that the Department of Education (DOE) evaluate the political slant of the center's publications and academic material. The DOE refused, referring the complaint to "normal academic channels." When two congressmen then intervened on behalf of the TJCC to ask Secretary of Education Terrence Bell to freeze the center's Title VI funding, Bell responded that "federal interference would be unwarranted and illegal ... Questions of academic freedom as well as of state and local control of education also enter in here."

"Among the issues raised in Tucson was the extent to which people not involved in the academy should set the parameters for academic inquiry," says Prof. Robert Gimello, who was director of the Near Eastern Center when the TJCC launched its attack. That issue is now central to the controversy surrounding HR 3077. If signed into law, the bill would create a congressional committee with oversight responsibilities for academic matters that not even the strains of the Cold War managed to politicize. Two out of seven committee members would be seconded from the intelligence agencies or the Department of Homeland Security, while the remaining five would be "experts" in the field of higher education. One could reasonably expect these to be drafted from the same think tanks that have most fiercely lobbied for the bill and that constitute the favorite recruiting ground of the current administration.

The committee would advise the Secretary of Education, who, in making grants, is directed "to take into account the degree to which activities of centers, programs, and fellowships at [institutions of higher education] advance national interests, generate and disseminate information, and foster debate on U.S. foreign policy from diverse perspectives." These requirements are as broad as they are unclear, with the task of interpretation left up to the committee.

Based on the committee's evaluation and advice, federal funding for research and education would be approved or withheld. The \$86.2 million spent annually on Title VI programs makes up a mere 0.005 percent of the federal budget. No less that 118 "national resource centers" receive parcels of this funding, however, and many of them are dependent on it, especially as it provides "federal endorsement" that encourages private and corporate donors.

Of these 118 centers, 11 are Middle East studies departments, the real targets of the bill. There are obvious reasons for this concern about Middle East studies: an area of inquiry that examines

Hoover Institution and contributing editor to *National Review*. To gauge the implications of HR 3077, it is instructive to look briefly at their various interlocking arguments.

In October 2001, Martin Kramer published *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America*. His central claim—that Middle East area studies are literally a waste of money—rests on several bases: a) it is left-wing, pro-Arab, and shows far too much understanding for Third World causes; b) it served to conceal the gathering Islamist threat against America leading up to 9/11; and c) it studies cultural and historical topics that are of no consequence to national security. Kramer concludes that because the security of the state demands research focused on our ever-plotting Muslim and Arab enemies, federally funded Middle East scholars must be mobilized to this end. The study of terrorism, he argues, must override the study of culture and history.

One of the many things that Kramer ignores is that since the early 1970s, a separate field within the social sciences called "terrorism studies" has emerged

THE BILL WOULD CREATE A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WITH **OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ACADEMIC MATTERS** THAT NOT EVEN THE STRAINS OF THE **COLD WAR MANAGED TO POLITICIZE.**

questions related to Islamism and the Arab-Israeli conflict is a natural focus of neocon nitpicking.

The most prominent advocates of HR 3077 have been Martin Kramer, a senior associate in the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*; Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum (which publishes the *Middle East Quarterly*); and Stanley Kurtz, a fellow at the

and expanded exponentially. Research is focused on the causes, dynamics, and remedies of terrorism, and co-operation between academics and the intelligence agencies is the order of the day. Even within this field, however, the most constructive contributions tend to come from those who study not only terrorist tactics or strategy, but also the social, cultural, and historical backgrounds of those classified as terrorists—the stuff

that Kramer thinks is useless simply because it is not obvious.

The attacks of 9/11 came as a shock to America and the world, but Kramer claims that if Middle East scholars had only made better use of federal funding, they would have been able to see the writing on the wall. When Kramer spoke at Princeton a year after the appearance of his book, I had the opportunity to ask him where he had published his own prescient predictions of 9/11. He too had failed, of course. Having spent several years with one foot in terrorism studies and the other in Middle East studies, I know of no one in academia (whether federally funded or not), think tanks, or government who foresaw 9/11. Not even Kramer. His argument may be influential, but it is nonetheless petty.

Pipes has taken credit on behalf of Campus Watch for the advancement of HR 3077, and it is therefore warranted to ask what kind of opinions merit his organization's censure. Professor Hamid Dabashi of Columbia University is attacked for having remarked, "People near and dear to me, whether they live in downtown Manhattan, in Kandahar, in Ramallah, in Jerusalem, or in Baghdad, are at the mercy of US foreign policies." The late Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said, Pipes has railed, "calls the U.S. policy in Iraq a 'grotesque show' perpetrated by a 'small cabal' of unelected individuals who hijacked U.S. policy. He accuses 'George Bush and his minions' of hiding their imperialist grab for 'oil and hegemony' under a false intent to build democracy and human

that, "instead of restricting the membership of [the congressional oversight] committees to scholars, policy makers and policy experts from think tanks need to be empowered to sit on such panels." Congress bought it, passing HR 3077 unanimously.

While there are doubtless problems in academia, that scholars have views is not one of them. HR 3077 talks of diversity but rather aims to mute criticism of the neocon agenda. If their concern were truly to enhance national security, the neocons—not known for their adversity to spending tax dollars on "urgent matters"—would presumably have proposed that another 0.005 percent of the federal budget be appropriated to fund terrorism studies. Instead, they attempt to strangle the funding of those whose views they disagree with. Moreover, if the neocons were even slightly concerned with conservative principles, rather than the corporatist mobilization of civil society in the service of their cause, they would understand that attaching political strings to federal funding of academia is wholly inappropriate.

The analytical failures of Middle East scholars are pointed out by those who warned us most vociferously of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and told us that liberating Iraq would be a quick thing. Pipes and Kramer both wrote their Ph.D. dissertations in medieval Islamology (and at least Pipes received Title VI funding), yet now they are complaining about the production of useless, non-applied research. The whole mess would be simply trivial if it weren't true that wherever political commissars are put in place to regulate the academic debate, the debate tends to suffer. ■

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CAMPUS WATCH HAS ENCOURAGED STUDENTS TO INFORM ON PROFESSORS THAT EXPRESS THE WRONG VIEWS AND BRIEFLY MAINTAINED ONLINE "DOSSIERS" ON OUTSPOKEN SCHOLARS.

Daniel Pipes, a recent presidential appointee to the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace, has complemented Kramer's accusations by creating Campus Watch, a self-appointed, on-line thought police. Campus Watch monitors institutions, faculty, and campus activities and reports instances of "extremism," "analytical failure," and "apologetics" on its Web site. It has encouraged students to inform on professors that express the wrong views and briefly maintained online "dossiers" on outspoken scholars. (It had to remove these dossiers from its site because the personal harassment of individuals looked far too much like an assault on the diversity of opinions that Campus Watch claimed to defend.)

rights." Prof. Stephen Zunes of the University of San Francisco is reported to have said, "Zionist money is *de facto* U.S. foreign policy." These remarks range from the perceptive to the controversial. That Campus Watch uses them as examples of intolerable speech should give some indication of the forthcoming interpretation of HR 3077.

Stanley Kurtz has written extensively on the need to curb academia and was invited to testify before a congressional committee in June 2003 about the need for legislation. Virtually volunteering his services (and those of Pipes and Kramer, to whom he paid due homage), Kurtz expanded on his belief that academia is characterized by "intellectual failure and moral bankruptcy," suggesting

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Battle of Algiers*]

French Lesson

By Steve Sailer

The Pentagon's special-operations chiefs screened the once-famous 1965 film "The Battle of Algiers" last August, inspiring its timely re-release in selected theatres this month. Produced by arch-terrorist Saadi Yacef (who played himself) and directed by the Italian Communist Gillo Pontecorvo, this favorite of the old New Left recounts with remarkably dispassionate (if selective) accuracy one of France's many military victories on its road to losing the 1954-1962 Algerian war of independence. Ultimately, the 132-year-old settlement of one million "pied noir" Europeans was driven into the sea.

The Pentagon commandos' flier advertised, "How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas ... Children shoot soldiers at point blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically." The paratroopers' plan was to track down Yacef's top killers using intensive interrogation (i.e., torture).

Perhaps, though, our soldiers should have shown their civilian overlords "The Battle of Algiers" before the latter blithely decided to occupy an Arab country. For extra verisimilitude, the special-ops boys could have strapped Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans ideologue-warriors to their armchairs, pinned their eyelids open, attached electrodes, and applied little jolts of juice to help them remember the movie better.

Even without such stimulation, "The Battle of Algiers" is hard to forget but also hard to enjoy. It's excellent filmmaking and frank history, yet distasteful entertainment because there are no heroes.

The central figure is the illiterate hoodlum Ali la Pointe, portrayed by the illiterate farmer Brahim Haggiag, a North African James Dean in his only movie. Why this superannuated juvenile delinquent became Yacef's best murderer is of obvious relevance today. Apparently, Ali la Pointe, like many Arabs, was outraged by the French guillotining of a terrorist who had murdered eight civilians, including a seven-year-old girl. Considering how many thousands of innocents both sides slaughtered, it's puzzling why the Muslims objected even more to a handful of the guilty being executed, but such are the snares Westerners blunder into when they rule an alien culture.

More generally, the sullen ex-pimp, like so many high-testosterone young men in Iraq, Palestine, and everywhere, just couldn't stand wealthy and powerful outsiders giving orders instead of him.

"The Battle of Algiers" ignores France's expensive efforts to buy the hearts and minds of the Arabs and Berbers. Nor does it stress how the insurgents, to prevent peaceful compromise, mutilated and decapitated moderate Muslims and assassinated liberal Europeans. But what it does show of Yacef's 1956 terror bombings of bistros and discos is horrifying enough. Alistair Horne's exhaustive 1978 history, *A Savage War of Peace*, confirms many of the film's details. (Paul Johnson's *tour de force* summary of Horne's book—furiously illustrating how a few extremists can launch a vicious cycle of provocation, reprisal, and outrage—climaxes his famous *Modern Times*.)

In despair, Algiers' civil authorities hand policing over to the paratroopers

under Colonel Mathieu. This glamorous character was modeled partly on the redoubtable Jacques Massu, partly on the intellectual colonels like Marcel Bigeard, who had recently parachuted gallantly into the doomed fortress of Dien Bien Phu. While an involuntary guest of General Giap, Bigeard studied Mao's theories and then used them in his sophisticated counter-guerilla strategy in Algeria.

The anti-French filmmakers give Mathieu most of the best lines. When challenged at a press conference about torture, he answers with Descartes' logic and Cyrano's panache:

The problem is: the FLN wants us to leave Algeria and we want to remain ... Despite varying shades of opinion, you all agree that we must remain ... Therefore, to be precise, I would now like to ask you a question: Should France remain in Algeria? If you answer "yes," then you must accept all the necessary consequences.

The paras liquidated the Casbah rebels' leadership in 1957. In Algeria, torture worked. What the film doesn't show is that in France, though, the public started to lose the stomach for the "necessary consequences." Alarmed that the politicians might throw away their fallen comrades' sacrifices, the paratroopers threatened to drop on Paris in May 1958 unless Gen. Charles de Gaulle became France's strong man.

Once in power, however, that great patriot resolved to cut and run. He had to weather two coup attempts and countless assassination plots, but, minus the Algerian tumor, long-suffering France emerged peaceful, prosperous, and democratic. ■

Steve Sailer is TAC's film critic and a reporter for UPI.

BOOKS

[The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire, Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., Ivan R. Dee, 256 pages]

Imperial Destiny—or Curse?

By Wayne Merry

WHEN WILY OLD Ben Franklin emerged from the Constitutional Convention in his native Philadelphia, an acquaintance inquired what kind of government the participants had chosen for the new United States. Franklin famously replied, "A republic, if you can keep it."

Among the dangers to republican and constitutional government in this country, even Franklin probably would not have been sufficiently far-sighted to include the pursuit of global hegemony or, to speak in blunt terms, an American Empire. When the Founding Fathers used the term "empire," they envisioned the growth of their country within the physical limits of the continent (or, in Jefferson's case, the Western Hemisphere) but not the expansion of American power around the globe and intruding into regions of marginal interest (or even awareness) to our citizenry.

Obviously, the American Republic has come a long way since Franklin's day, to become the wonder of the world in scale, power, affluence, and (thank God) the preservation and expansion of individual liberty. Sadly, however, the world's wonder is now tinged—if not infused—with anxiety that America is losing its way or, more to the point, losing its republican bearings in the exercise of its unmatched influence and (for the moment) unchallenged military might. The terrorist attacks on our territory now barely two years ago served to

bring this question into stark relief, but the underlying problem is not new. The messianic rhetoric of the Bush White House is scarcely less restrained than that of his predecessor. Clinton reveled in triumphalist post-Cold-War bombast and proclaimed our unconstitutional war against Serbia a struggle against "evil," while his secretary of state postured without restraint about the "indispensable nation" and American "virtuous power."

Concern about the intoxication of American power is venerable. Worried patriots (among others) protested unrestrained presidential actions in Indochina by both Democratic and Republican administrations; high-handed interventions in Latin America by numerous chief executives (including the sanctimonious Woodrow Wilson); our shameless and unprovoked war with Spain, which engaged this country deeply in Asia with fateful consequences; and our land-grab war with Mexico. Today, there is a vast difference, in that the United States stands alone on earth in its ability to choose or to reject imperial undertakings. In the past, even our most bullying actions in this hemisphere could at some level be justified by the need to keep competing European powers out, while our engagements across the Atlantic or Pacific were juxtaposed against comparable power centers or ideologies.

No longer. The exhaustion of Soviet Russia by its own internal contradictions left the United States in a uniquely

counterpoise that of Moscow has evaporated. Beyond the outside world's inevitable annoyance at the concentration of so much power in the hands of a single government, however, is another, more insidious problem. As the only "superpower" or "hyperpower," the United States can not only choose where, when, and how to exercise its writ in far-flung disputes about which Washington understands little (and never enough). Worse, we now also exercise power even when and where we have no awareness of doing so.

Little recognized in this country is that the scope and pervasiveness of American power is now the lodestone for every other country in the pursuit of its own interests. While Washington policymakers fancy they are responding to the actions of foreign competitors or "rogue states," the opposite is generally the case. Today, every government on earth, in every action or policy it undertakes, is influenced by American power and policies or, even more subtly, by its perceptions and expectations of American power and policies. Thus, other countries are not so much acting as reacting, with the United States as the default power of the globe, seen by one and all as a player even when we have no conscious realization of being at the table, let alone of holding some of the cards.

There can be no more important issue before the body politic than this because other problems (international terrorism, WMD proliferation, the Arab-Israeli dis-

AMERICA IS LOSING ITS WAY OR, MORE TO THE POINT, ITS REPUBLICAN BEARINGS IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS UNMATCHED INFLUENCE AND UNCHALLENGED MILITARY MIGHT.

blessed position in the world, but within that blessing lay a curse. As the dominant political, economic, and military power, America is the locus of envy and resentment in every corner of the world, including among our traditional allies, whose need for American power to

pute, the rise of China, etc.) are all framed by the external world in terms of American power. This should have been clear during the run-up to the Iraq war, when, for every capital other than Washington, the issue was not containing Saddam Hussein but constraining or

even restraining the United States. Some governments were so undiplomatic as to say so, but many of America's allies tried to evade the issue through circumlocutions that helped the Bush Administration ignore the fact that it, rather than Saddam, was the policy "problem" for most of the globe.

A useful—though incomplete—textbook for a concerned citizen is *The Imperial Tense, Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, a collection of 20 diverse essays edited by Andrew Bacevich of Boston University. While there is a fair amount of overlap among the various articles, this collection reflects most of the distribution curve of current opinion on the subject. I found the division of the essays into four "camps" less than analytically clear but did not benefit the less for that. It may strike some readers as odd that two of the most prominent standard-bearers of opposing views on the subject—Max Boot and Noam Chomsky—are not among the authors represented, but that gives less-well-known writers a broader readership. Several America-bashing essays will probably set many readers' teeth on edge (they did mine), but it is a needful exercise to endure these tirades because much of the world unfortunately holds even less charitable views of us. I found two articles especially useful: Martin Walker's "An Empire Unlike Any Other," and Stephen Peter Rosen's "Imperial Choices." Read together, they give sensible and clear-eyed descriptions of the nature of American power in the world today and of the dilemmas that power brings regardless of American motives.

There are, however, two major shortcomings in this book, which should not prevent an interested reader from taking it up. First, the pro and contra about an American Empire is presented largely as a matter of the political Right versus Left. The issue in fact divides Americans in much more complex ways. The self-styled neoconservatives, for example, are the antithesis of conservatism. In truth, they are radicals, combining aspects of Wilsonian ambition to remake

the world with Trotskyist notions of permanent revolution. To a classical conservative in the tradition of Burke, Quincy Adams, or Robert Taft, the neocons are abhorrent. There also are dangerously imperial tendencies on the Left, for which the interventionist record of the Clinton years should be

nate to domestic goals, that a republic is engaged with the external world so its citizens may live safely and enjoy their liberties. The idea that the American Republic should become the servant of foreign relations is, to me, an inversion of the proper order of things and an ill-conceived imitation of failed monarchist

THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC SHOULD **BECOME THE SERVANT OF** FOREIGN RELATIONS IS AN **INVERSION OF THE PROPER ORDER OF THINGS AND** AN ILL-CONCEIVED **IMITATION OF FAILED ABSOLUTIST REGIMES OF THE PAST.**

proof enough. Opposition to empire unites Americans of diverse political loyalties who agree that our vast power should be used with more restraint and be linked to real American interests rather than to will-of-the-wisp causes and crusades. For these citizens, the United States should not engage itself in far-flung disputes merely because it can, and least of all because a place is labeled as "strategic," because that logic leads to every point on the globe. The recently formed Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy (of which I am a founding member) unites persons across the spectrum of American politics who might not agree on much else, but who can see clearly that empire is not good for the United States.

Second, there is not much in the book about the impact of an American Empire on the American Republic. This, to me, is the central question, of greater import than our role in the world, consequent though that is. How does our pursuit of "global hegemony" affect Franklin's challenge to us to keep the Republic? Several of the essays do discuss the diminution of civil liberties and the expansion of non-transparent government powers, but the texts are pretty much outward looking, as is most of the debate about empire. I find this both strange and disquieting.

In my own quarter-century with the U.S. Foreign Service, I approached my duties on the assumption that American foreign policy is and should be subordi-

and absolutist regimes of the past. Sadly, over the years, I found that the institutions of America's role in the world—our diplomacy, military, and intelligence agencies—have been greatly corrupted by the imperial sway our country assumed during the Cold War and was loath to put down in its aftermath. Even worse, I observed that the one institution that should be relied on to counteract these tendencies—the Congress—is itself increasingly mired in the temptations of empire, encouraged by a vast web of Washington-based but often foreign-funded lobbying groups with mandates to engage American power on behalf of external interests.

Washington as the New Rome attracts people of imperial ambition, often with little liking for the America beyond the Capital Beltway. These people revel in the prominence and power that America gives to our government officials, but I often wonder how dedicated they are to the Constitution and whether the American Republic means as little to them as the Roman Republic meant to the Caesars.

It profits a man nothing to lose his soul for the whole world. Nor, as Quincy Adams warned long ago, will it profit America to gain an empire and lose our republican soul. ■

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[*FDR's Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression*, Jim Powell, Crown Forum, 352 pages]

Roosevelt's Raw Deal

By Thomas E. Woods Jr.

IT WOULD NOT be correct to say that the major figures of the neoconservative establishment have made their peace with Franklin D. Roosevelt's legacy, since they were never at war with it in the first place. Because prominent neo-conservatives have even declared much of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs to be off limits, for them a reappraisal of the New Deal would be simply out of the question. The New Deal, after all, is what Newt Gingrich tells us saved the country from the Great Depression.

Yet if conservatives accept and even celebrate FDR's legacy, they have abandoned any principled case against federal power that they might have had,

reducing themselves to bickering over mere details—\$12 billion versus \$15 billion for this or that program.

FDR's Folly, Jim Powell's excellent new book, is deeply subversive for two reasons. It not only debunks one of the key planks of the mythology on which the present regime is based, but in its direct assault on the New Deal it also implicitly attacks the complacency and lack of principle that characterize so much of mainstream conservatism and libertarianism, which are often content to advocate only the tiniest, most insignificant reforms around the edges of the gargantuan bureaucratic structure erected by FDR.

Powell's book fills an important gap in the literature critical of FDR's domestic program. John T. Flynn's *Roosevelt Myth* (1948) remains an outstanding book, containing not only some excellent criticism of New Deal programs but also a great many unforgettable anecdotes and biographical portraits of the key players. Yet Flynn, a former Progressive, was never entirely sound on economics and was more sympathetic to Herbert Hoover than the historical record and good economics can justly allow. Powell, on the other hand, correctly demonstrates that it was Hoover's unprecedented program of intervention in the economy that prefigured the New Deal and that ensured that the downturn would not be the limited one of 1920-21 (with which Warren Harding had dealt by doing nothing at all, apart from cutting government expenditures) but would instead be indefinitely prolonged.

On the causes of the initial downturn, the reader would be better served by Murray N. Rothbard's *America's Great Depression*, now in a fifth edition. Rothbard's book employs the Austrian theory of the business cycle to pinpoint the roots of the Depression in the monetary inflation and credit expansion of the 1920s, whose effect was to introduce systematic discoordination into the structure of production. According to the Austrian theory, the artificially low interest rate brought about by Fed intervention interferes with the salutary

function that the interest rate is supposed to perform: the co-ordination of saving and investment.

Fed intervention leads to a misleadingly low interest rate. This, in turn, encourages investment that builds up the economy's capital structure in processes that take longer to produce consumer goods. (At a lower interest rate, investment in more time-consuming production processes suddenly appears profitable.) Because people are not saving to provide for this buildup, but are instead spending on consumer goods that can be produced without longer processes, the longer processes must eventually be liquidated and their resources, where possible, reallocated to lines of production more in conformity with people's spending and saving.

This adjustment process is the recession. Government attempts to interfere with this altogether necessary adjustment process can lengthen the recession or even turn it into a full-fledged depression, as happened under Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, both of whom were committed interventionists.

Powell, on the other hand, adopts Milton Friedman's view of the Depression, according to which the Fed's failure to inflate during a crucial period of monetary contraction was the primary culprit in the Depression. Friedman's view essentially ignores the inflationary expansion of the 1920s and its economy-wide consequences. It is a strange view for a free-marketeer to hold, moreover, since it implies that the market is self-regulating in every area except (for some reason) money and that without the consistent intervention of a central bank—a non-market institution—the market must suffer periodic downturns.

But Powell is simply excellent on the reasons for the depth and persistence of the Depression. He shows that ceaseless federal intervention in the economy, carried out in the name of the less fortunate, instead created a hostile and suffocating climate for business and made it more expensive to hire people. These policies began not with FDR but with his predecessor, Herbert Hoover—who, far

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from being the laissez-faire purist of popular belief, enacted perhaps the most wide-ranging program of interventionism in American history up to that point.

Powell makes quick work of New Deal agricultural policy, perhaps the stupidest and most obviously destructive program of a decade of governmental stupidity and destruction. At a time when Americans' food intake was desperately low—a Department of Agriculture study found that not enough food was being produced to sustain the American population even at mere subsistence—FDR supported the destruction of enormous quantities of crops as well as some six million pigs. Following this destruction, he introduced systematic acreage reductions in order to force up farm prices—all at the expense of the rest of the population.

The program favored the largest farmers, since federal payments were based on the amount of acreage one owned and could therefore keep out of production. Powell cites a 1989 study that found that the USDA “gave, in direct payment to the 29,000 largest farms, an average of \$46,073—an amount that exceeded the net worth (including the value of houses and cars) of over half the families in America.”

Powell shows that New Deal programs were not only destructive and ill conceived, but also that at times they worked at cross-purposes with one another. Thus while the Agriculture Adjustment Administration was intended to increase farm income, Powell observes that “farmers actually found themselves worse off because FDR's National Recovery Administration had been even more successful in forcing up the prices that consumers, including farmers, had to pay for manufactured goods.”

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), in fact, which established the National Recovery Administration, appears to have worked at cross-purposes with itself. On the one hand, it sought to keep wage rates high, convinced of the fallacious idea that high wage rates lead to greater overall “pur-

chasing power” throughout the economy.

On the other hand, the NIRA established hundreds of legally sanctioned, industry-wide cartels, each of which was permitted to draw up a production code governing such areas as wages, hours of operation, and *minimum* prices—which meant that businesses would be prevented from underselling each other. Its most obvious effect was to raise prices on every good whose production had been organized into one of these cartels and on every good that used such artificially overpriced goods as inputs in its own production. So much for the higher wages FDR said he wanted—higher nominal wages meant little at a time when so many goods were deliberately made more expensive.

Practically nothing in FDR's domestic program escapes Powell's overwhelming critique. The various public-works programs that FDR established and the billions of dollars he devoted to them

as those of the New Deal were actually criticized on constitutional grounds. Today, even to raise the question of whether constitutional authorization exists for proposed federal legislation is to invite stunned incomprehension on the part of politicians of both parties, to say nothing of the media and our so-called intellectual class.

The wisdom or otherwise of the idea of judicial review is a thorny problem not to be taken up here; the present reviewer prefers Thomas Jefferson's idea of concurrent review, in which the Supreme Court acts in an essentially advisory capacity, and in which each branch of the federal government is responsible for upholding the Constitution and preventing the passage of legislation repugnant to it. Wherever one stands on judicial review, however, the point is that during the 1930s the Court attempted to restrict New Deal legislation. Thanks to FDR's threats against the Court (which had their effect even

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only served to dry up capital in an already capital-starved private sector, in favor of government projects that were inherently wasteful, since they lacked the kind of profit-and-loss test that guides entrepreneurs in their investment decisions.

New Deal labor laws, as well as the increased labor costs associated with Social Security, further contributed to the unemployment problem. FDR's vicious rhetorical salvos against the business community, along with his seemingly ceaseless tax increases, were not exactly recipes for recovery. Powell shows even the Tennessee Valley Authority, touted by many New Deal boosters as an indisputable boon, to be a financial boondoggle rife with corruption.

It is heartwarming to recall a time in American history when programs such

though his notorious Court-packing scheme ultimately failed) and his own appointments to that august body, the Court would never again constitute a serious obstacle to the expansion of the federal government's power.

Powell provides a number of telling examples of the kind of Orwellian jurisprudence to which the hapless American population has been subject thanks to the New Deal. Thus in *Currin v. Wallace* (1939) the Court suggested that the federal government could extend its power over virtually any area in which its intervention might contribute to the “general welfare.” With that the federal government seized a vast expanse of power, rendering the careful enumeration of federal powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution essentially superfluous.

Excellent as Powell's discussion of the New Deal Court is, I would have devoted more attention to how it contributed to the erosion of American federalism. Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court has more or less turned its attention away from the federal government altogether, dedicating itself instead to overturning state laws that do not conform to the exacting constitutional standards of Harry Blackmun and Stephen Breyer. It was not for nothing that James Madison's proposal for a federal veto of state legislation was overwhelmingly rejected at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

A century and a half later, stinging from FDR's rebuke and implied threats, the Court became an instrument for justifying federal action and for reducing the states to a condition of utter subordination. Jefferson had considered the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the states and the people all powers not delegated to the federal government, to be the cornerstone of the entire Constitution. In *United States v. Darby* (1940), FDR's Court airily dismissed the Tenth Amendment as a mere "tautology."

The states, toward which the Court now directed its watchful eye, had by the 20th century been all but stripped of the defense mechanisms and spirit of

independence that had been so evident throughout the states of both North and South during the 19th century. (This is a story best told by James Kilpatrick's unfortunately out-of-print classic *The Sovereign States* and by Forrest McDonald's *States' Rights and the Union*.) States' rights and local self-government were yet another casualty of the New Deal.

Jim Powell's book, which has been needed for decades now, provides an excellent overview of a period in American history regarding which the conventional wisdom could not be more wrong. Powell's prose, while engaging, is measured and temperate rather than aggressively polemical. Armed with an overwhelming case, he has no need to be snide or obnoxious.

Still, Powell is relentless in the tough and incisive questions he poses to FDR and his New Deal; each chapter title, in fact, takes the form of a question. The only question about the New Deal that the reader will have by the end is how anyone in his right mind could have supported it. ■

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[*Unguarded Gates: A History of America's Immigration Crisis*, Otis L. Graham Jr., Rowman & Littlefield, 237 pages]

Immigration Then & Now

By Chilton Williamson Jr.

REAL WRITERS ARE HAPPIEST when they most closely approach the writerly ideal, which is to write what is 100 percent new and fresh 100 percent of the time. True activists are happiest when they are free to realize the activist ideal, which is to repeat exactly the same message in precisely the same terms over and over again. Where the immigration debate is concerned, it is necessary for even the most idealistic writer to share something of the activist's lower standard of originality, together with his heightened threshold for boredom.

As early as 1995, Peter Brimelow was in fairness able to claim in *Alien Nation*—the first of the commercially published, for-the-trade immigration titles spawned by immigration's Second Great Wave—that the "patriots" had succeeded handily in defeating the "enthusiasts" on the battlefield of ideas, no matter how flagging their cause on the field of politics. It is arguable, in fact, that the restrictionists who opposed the First Great Wave of the 1890s and early 1900s had already said all that there is—or needs—to be said on behalf of immigration restraint and that those of us who came to take up the cause 70 and 80 years later have been merely repeating, recycling, and updating their very cogent arguments—all of which enjoyed significant attention and widespread circulation in the magazines and books printed in their day.

This is all by way of saying that Otis Graham's *Unguarded Gates* necessarily includes significant overlap with previously published works (books, pamphlets, articles) on his subject, though to his credit he has to some extent got



"You said I should spend more time with our children, so turned their faces into icons."

round his problem by telescoping dramatically the history of the first stage of immigration-control sentiment (from the colonial period up to the First Wave) and going on to expatiate upon the differences between nativism (as represented by the Know-Nothings and their American Party in the 1850s) and restrictionism, as embodied by the Immigration Restriction League, founded in Boston in 1894—an angle that to my knowledge had not been considered in the literature before. (Brimelow does, however, mention in passing that restrictionism, so often dismissed by historians as racism, has often been a progressive cause in America.)

Professor Graham, the author of many previous books, taught American history at the University of California at Santa Barbara until his retirement in 1995; is now Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington; has served as chairman of the board of the Center for Immigration Studies; and for many years has advocated policies promoting both immigration reform and its allied cause, environmentalism. Graham, therefore, approaches the subject of restrictionism from a liberal rather than a conservative perspective.

Know-Nothingism was above all specifically anti-Catholic, rather than generically anti-immigrant; also it was reformist and strongly anti-slavery (something that tends to get left out of the history books). Nevertheless, it is remembered as “xenophobic,” hence its contribution to the American political vocabulary of the powerfully evocative and irredeemably negative term “nativist”. One reason for this, Graham argues, is that in the 19th century (as today), “We lack entirely a working term for citizens defending their community interest when immigrants, wittingly or unwittingly, put them at risk.” (He adds, “Oddly, the term nativism has come to run in one direction, toward xenophobia, never toward patriotism or community defense.”) One way or another, it was only to be expected that the arrival of millions upon millions of transforma-

tive immigrants to the United States should have produced a restrictionist movement purposing to address the manifold problems to which mass immigration gave rise. Even so, such prominent restrictionists as Theodore Roo-

gress do not claim that the ‘Nordic’ race, or even the Anglo-Saxon race, is the best race in the world.” Rather, Vaile went on to add, Anglo-Saxons were determined to preserve their country with all its faults, for no better reason that they had

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sevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Samuel Gompers—men noted in their day for their efforts in progressive causes ranging far beyond immigration—neither considered themselves “nativists,” nor were described as such by their contemporaries. Indeed, Graham writes, the whole notion of nativism—when detached from its specific and limited root, the Know-Nothings—is “profoundly unhistorical.” (Interestingly, he quotes John Higham—the historian whose vastly influential history of immigration, *Strangers in the Land*, created in the minds of several generations of Americans the restrictionism = nativism equivalency—as confessing in 1958, and soon after the publication of his book, “[N]ativism now looks less adequate as a vehicle for studying the struggles of nationalities in America than my earlier report of it [suggested]....”)

Graham’s account of the history of immigration from the post-World-War I era through the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act for the most part covers ground already plowed and replowed by previous writers. In this portion of his book, three principal themes stand forward. The first is the restrictionists’ uninterest in racialism and racist theories as they proceeded to draft and approve the now-infamous legislation that fixed the quota system in place. (The word “race” in the 1920s was synonymous with “nationality,” Graham reminds us. Rep. William Vaile of Colorado emphasized on the floor of the House, “[T]he restrictionists of Con-

made it, and that it suited them the way it was.) The second is the extent to which the quota system, by which immigration numbers were reduced to a trickle (and in one year, at least, to a negative figure) came under fire almost as soon as it was implemented—and

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remained so, until the immigrationists at last had their way with the passage of the 1965 Act.

Graham reaps the benefits of his fore-shortened treatment of American immigration history by taking advantage of the space conserved with a detailed treatment of the post-'65 decades. From the place where Brimelow, Roy Beck, and I left off the sad story in the mid-1990s—just when the restrictionists' hopes were being raised by the Jordan Commission's report, Proposition 187, and the Republican Congress's limitation of welfare benefits granted to recently arrived immigrants—Otis Graham carries the tale forward, through the GOP's 180-degree course change to woo the Hispanic vote and the ensuing Bush-Fox amnesty proposal, to the events of Sept. 11, and beyond. In respect of time, he enjoys an enviable advantage over his predecessors—though not as enviable as would have been the case had the attack by a handful of scruffy Arab immigrants on the World Trade Center effected significant reforms in America's immigration policy. (In the wake of the terrorist attack on

New York City, the number of illegal entrants into the U.S. actually increased.) Graham does suggest, "[T]he global jihad of some Islamists against the West, and especially the core country of the West, has the potential to forever alter the immigration systems of the United States and the West, and the very image of the immigrant in the United States." This, of course, ought to make sense. Unfortunately, the American political establishment no longer does.

Graham accurately describes what he calls "an inept policy system that is a combination of the anachronistic and

States "a country of perpetual immigration"; David North opined more than a decade ago that Western democracies "cannot cope with illegal immigration.") Graham warns it had better not be impossible, as uncontrolled immigration has a history of generating a powerful populist-nationalist political response capable of rolling over a centrist establishment. Somehow, one can imagine a worse future for this country.

Graham believes that a nation's responsibility to pass on an intact economy and a sustainable natural environment trumps any possible obligation to

IN THE WAKE OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON NEW YORK CITY, THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ENTRANTS INTO THE U.S. ACTUALLY INCREASED.

the unintended." Reversing that policy against the terrific momentum that it has been allowed to attain would be an extraordinarily difficult job: some say an impossible one. (The sociologist Douglas Massey has declared the United

give foreigners a new home. Lady Liberty, he suggests, should be made to represent, not "Send Me Your Poor," but "Liberty and Sustainability Enlightening the World." In addition to inspiration, he believes, the United States ought to provide increasingly generous birth control, along with technical and economic aid, to Third World sending countries mired in poverty and suffocating beneath stacked layers of humanity. Unfortunately for this suggestion, birth control is morally contested, and the United States—owing to many previous attempts and one ongoing one to micro-manage the world—can no longer afford foreign aid. It is therefore more than possible, at this late stage, that the issue of immigration, like most insuperable "problems" throughout history, will never be "solved" at all but simply superseded by some new "problem" to arise in future—one of equal or greater proportions and, quite likely, catastrophic in its effect. ■

Chilton Williamson Jr. is Editor for Books at Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and the author of The Immigration Mystique: America's False Conscience.



"Your call will be answered by our next available operator. Unfortunately, all of our operators are currently married or dating someone at this time."

A World Apart



“Chicken Countries Shunning U.S. Beef,” screamed a *New York Post* headline recently. As far as eye-catching headlines go, it was a good one. The

message was not exactly subliminal. Frogs, Krauts, and Limeys—bad, Americans—good. Nothing wrong with that—except for the facts, of course. The United States was one of the first countries to ban the importation of British beef after mad cow disease was discovered. As panic swept the country in 1989, officials at the Department of Agriculture called it a matter of life and death. The scare was exacerbated by Oprah Winfrey’s 1996 declaration that she would stop eating hamburgers because of her fears over mad cow disease. In 1999, America threatened to ban blood donations from anyone who had visited Britain the preceding 20 years, in case they had contracted the human equivalent. Anti-American British tabloids had a field day, but I can’t remember anyone calling the Yanks chickens. Mind you, they’ve called Americans everything else, including chickens, although in a different context.

Ironically, among the most strident anti-Americans in the Euro crowd are the Brits. It’s obviously something to do with having had to eat crow in Yorktown or having had their chestnuts pulled out of the fire twice in the space of 20 years, with American GIs doing the pulling. Ironically, the French are mostly pro-American, despite their leaders, as are the Germans and Italians. My very own, the Greeks, are even worse than the Brits. The most shameful moment came following the WTC tragedy. When asked for a minute of silence for the victims during an international football match, the crowd booed full throttle.

What is it about Uncle Sam that turns the civilized Euros into America-haters? Is it because he’s so rich and powerful? Is it Coca-Cola and McDonald’s? Or is it American arrogance? Well, in my not so humble opinion, it’s all three, with a little European snobbery thrown in for good measure.

Hollywood does not help. Let’s face it: Europeans perceive America through movies, and as everyone who has ever seen a movie knows, the Hollywood version of America is of an evil country governed by crooks. When was the last time you saw a film in which a priest was not a sexual pervert? A policeman not a sadistic racist? An FBI or CIA agent not in the pay of drug dealers or of a shadowy corporation plotting to poison everyone’s water in pursuit of the almighty (not so mighty lately) dollar? Better yet, when was the last time Hollywood depicted a drug dealer, and a black dealer at that, as bad? Movies are not real life, and Europeans are supposedly a sophisticated lot who know better, and yet ... Just the violence in American films gives reason enough to America-haters to say I told you so. The disconnect between Hollywood and America fills the rest of the world with a distorted picture of the so-called land of opportunity.

The trouble with Europe is it can never look America in the eye as an equal. The tired old continent will always be like a junior overseas partner of a giant bank who is invited to the office party as a gracious gesture on the part of the American honcho.

And then there’s anti-Semitism. Nothing outrages Europeans more than to read American pundits accusing them of it. France, Germany, and Britain are swamped with Muslims—close to six million in France. They, and they alone, are responsible for anti-Semitic attacks against Jews and other outrages such as defacing synagogues and Jewish graves. Spineless European leaders fear their indigenous Muslims and fudge the issue. If there is any anti-Semitism left in Europe after World War II, it is confined to whispers in the drawing room, if that. Yet the American media persist in linking it with Europeans in general, as unfair a charge as it is false.

Uncle Sam going it alone in Iraq—while jingoist newspapers and networks called those who refused to follow Donald von Rumsfeld cowards—added fuel to the anti-American bonfire. Coward is a dirty word worldwide, and the only thing I can add are a few statistics. Between August 1914 and November 1918, one and half million French soldiers died in battle. This is three times more than all Americans who have died in every foreign war between 1776 and today. Over 120,000 French soldiers died in six weeks in the spring of 1940. Some 3,250,000 German soldiers died in two world wars, and close to five million Russians. The Brits lost something like two million in the two wars. A tiny country such as my own has lost nearly a million soldiers since the turn of the 20th century. We Europeans need no lessons in dying for our countries from Americans. What we do need is a better American understanding of our cultural differences and of the fact that we cannot be like the Americans because we, sadly or otherwise, happen to be Europeans. ■